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ABSTRACT
We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management.
An investor can hold assets through an index or an active fund. Investing in the active fund involves
a time-varying cost, interpreted as managerial perk or ability. The investor responds to an increase
in the cost by flowing out of the active and into the index fund. While prices of assets held by the active
fund drop in anticipation of these outflows, the drop is expected to continue, leading to momentum.
Because outflows push prices below fundamental values, expected returns eventually rise, leading
to reversal. Besides momentum and reversal, fund flows generate comovement, lead-lag effects and
amplification, with all effects being larger for assets with high idiosyncratic risk. The active-fund manager’s
concern with commercial risk makes prices more volatile.
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Two of the most prominent ﬁnancial-market anomalies are momentum and reversal. Momentum
is the tendency of assets with good (bad) recent performance to continue overperforming (under-
performing) in the near future. Reversal concerns predictability based on a longer performance
history: assets that performed well (poorly) over a long period tend to subsequently underperform
(overperform). Closely related to reversal is the value eﬀect, whereby the ratio of an asset’s price
relative to book value is negatively related to subsequent performance. Momentum and reversal
have been documented extensively and for a wide variety of assets.1
Momentum and reversal are viewed as anomalies because they are hard to explain within
the standard asset-pricing paradigm with rational agents and frictionless markets. The prevalent
explanations of these phenomena are behavioral, and assume that agents react incorrectly to in-
formation signals.2 In this paper we show that momentum and reversal can arise in markets with
rational agents. We depart from the standard paradigm by assuming that investors delegate the
management of their portfolios to ﬁnancial institutions, such as mutual funds and hedge funds.
Our explanation emphasizes the role of fund ﬂows, and is loosely as follows. Suppose that a
negative shock hits the fundamental value of some assets. Investment funds holding these assets
realize low returns, triggering outﬂows by investors who update negatively about the ability of the
managers running these funds. As a consequence of the outﬂows, funds sell assets they own, and
this depresses further the prices of the assets hit by the original shock. If, in addition, outﬂows
are gradual because of institutional constraints (e.g., lock-up periods, institutional decision lags),
the selling pressure causes prices to decrease gradually, leading to momentum. At the same time,
because outﬂows push prices below fundamental values, expected returns eventually rise, leading
to reversal.
In addition to deriving momentum and reversal with rational agents, we contribute to the liter-
ature by building an equilibrium model with delegated portfolio management that is parsimonious
and can speak to a broad range of phenomena. Delegation, to institutions such as mutual funds
1Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document momentum for individual US stocks, predicting returns over horizons
of 3-12 months by returns over the past 3-12 months. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) document reversal, predicting
returns over horizons of up to 5 years by returns over the past 3-5 years. Fama and French (1992) document the value
eﬀect. This evidence has been extended to stocks in other countries (Fama and French 1998, Rouwenhorst 1998),
industry-level portfolios (Grinblatt and Moskowitz 1999), country indices (Asness, Liew, and Stevens 1997, Bhojraj
and Swaminathan 2006), bonds (Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen 2008), currencies (Bhojraj and Swaminathan 2006)
and commodities (Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst 2008). Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2008) extend and unify
much of this evidence and contain additional references.
2See, for example, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and
Stein (1999), and Barberis and Shleifer (2003).
1and hedge funds, is important in many markets. And while investors let fund managers invest on
their behalf, they move across funds, generating ﬂows that are large and linked to the funds’ past
performance.3 Yet, incorporating delegation and fund ﬂows into asset-pricing models is a daunting
task: it entails modeling multiple assets and funds, portfolio choice by fund managers (over assets)
and investors (over funds), and a motive for investors to be moving across funds, all in a dynamic
equilibrium setting. Our model includes these elements, while allowing for a tractable analysis of
fund ﬂows and their price eﬀects. The latter include not only momentum and reversal, but also
comovement, lead-lag eﬀects, ampliﬁcation, and the eﬀects of managers’ concern with commercial
risk.
Section 2 presents the model. We consider an inﬁnite-horizon continuous-time economy with
multiple risky assets, to which we refer as stocks, and one riskless asset. A competitive investor
can invest in stocks through an index fund that holds the market portfolio, and through an active
fund run by a competitive manager. The active fund can add value over the index fund because
exogenous buy-and-hold investors hold stocks in diﬀerent proportions than in the market portfolio:
the active fund overweighs “large residual supply” stocks, which are in low demand by buy-and-
hold investors and thus underpriced, and underweighs “small residual supply” stocks, which are in
high demand and overpriced.4 Flows between funds occur because the investor receives the return
of the active fund net of an exogenous time-varying cost, which can be interpreted as a managerial
perk or a reduced form for managerial ability. The manager determines the active fund’s portfolio,
and can invest his personal wealth in stocks through that fund. Both investor and manager are
inﬁnitely lived and maximize expected utility of intertemporal consumption.
Section 3 solves the model in the benchmark case of symmetric information, where the investor
observes the manager’s cost. When the cost increases, the investor ﬂows out of the active and
into to the index fund. This amounts to a net sale of stocks in large residual supply, which the
active fund overweighs, and net purchase of stocks in small residual supply, which the active fund
underweighs. The manager takes the other side of this transaction by raising his stake in the
fund.5 Because the manager is risk-averse, stocks in large residual supply become cheaper and oﬀer
3According to the New York Stock Exchange Factbook, the fraction of stocks held directly by individuals in 2002
was less than 40%. The importance of fund ﬂows and the link to past performance have been documented extensively.
See, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) for mutual funds, and Fund, Hsieh, Naik
and Ramadorai (2008) and Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers (2009) for hedge funds.
4The assumption of buy-and-hold investors ensures that the “true” market portfolio, which characterizes equilib-
rium asset returns, diﬀers from the market index tracked by the index fund. Such a diﬀerence would arise even in
the absence of buy-and-hold investors, provided that the market index is misconstructed, i.e., does not consist of one
share of each stock. For example, the index might not be including some stocks, which are instead accessible to the
active fund.
5The manager performs two roles in our model: select the active portfolio and take the other side of the investor’s
transactions. Separating the two roles would complicate the model without changing the main mechanisms. See
Section 2 for further discussion.
2higher expected return, while the opposite is true for stocks in small residual supply. Thus, the
investor’s ﬂows generate return reversal, i.e., price changes forecast opposite changes in expected
returns. Moreover, since ﬂows impact stocks in large and stocks in small residual supply in opposite
directions, they increase comovement within each group, while reducing comovement across groups.
The return reversal derived in Section 3 arises at any horizon. To generate momentum in the
short run and reversal in the long run, we introduce the additional assumption that fund ﬂows
exhibit inertia. Section 4 models inertia through an exogenous convex cost that the investor incurs
when changing her holdings of the active fund. In the presence of this adjustment cost, an increase
in the manager’s cost triggers gradual outﬂows from the active fund. Since these outﬂows are
anticipated and amount to net sales of stocks in large residual supply, they cause the prices of
these stocks to drop immediately. Yet, the drop is expected to continue, leading to momentum.
This result is puzzling: why is the manager willing to hold—and even overweigh—stocks that are
expected to underperform in the short run? The intuition is that these stocks oﬀer the manager
an attractive return over a long horizon because the anticipation of future outﬂows renders them
underpriced. The manager could earn an even more attractive return, on average, by not holding
the stocks until after the outﬂows occur. This, however, exposes him to the risk that the outﬂows
might not occur, in which case the stocks would cease to be underpriced.6 Thus, the short-run price
drop is possible only because of the high long-run expected return; and more generally, momentum
is possible only because of the subsequent reversal.
In addition to momentum, reversal and comovement, Sections 3 and 4 derive results on lead-lag
eﬀects, idiosyncratic risk and commercial risk. Because changes in the manager’s cost impact the
prices and subsequent expected returns of all stocks, past returns of one stock forecast subsequent
returns of other stocks. For example, in Section 4, a price drop of a stock in high residual supply
forecasts that other stocks in high residual supply will drop in the short run but have a high return
in the long run. Momentum, reversal, comovement and lead-lag eﬀects are larger for stocks with
high idiosyncratic risk because these stocks are more sensitive to ﬂows between the active and the
index fund. Finally, when the manager receives a larger perk and is hence more concerned about
commercial risk (i.e., future outﬂows), returns become more volatile.
Section 5 extends the analysis to the case of asymmetric information, where the investor does
not observe the manager’s cost and must infer it from fund performance. Asymmetric information
6The following three-period example illustrates the point. A stock is expected to pay oﬀ at 100 in Period 2. The
stock price is 92 in Period 0, and 80 or 100 in Period 1 with equal probabilities. Buying the stock in Period 0 earns
the manager a two-period expected capital gain of 8. Buying in Period 1 earns an expected capital gain of 20 if the
price is 80 and 0 if the price is 100. A risk-averse manager might prefer earning 8 rather than 20 or 0 with equal
probabilities, even though the expected capital gain between Periods 0 and 1 is negative.
3generates a causal link from performance to ﬂows: if, for example, the active fund underperforms
relative to the index fund, the investor infers that the cost has increased and ﬂows out of the
active and into the index fund. Causality from performance to ﬂows implies that the latter can be
triggered by shocks to stocks’ cashﬂows—in contrast to the case of symmetric information, where
ﬂows are driven only by changes in the cost.
The fund ﬂows triggered by cashﬂow shocks amplify the eﬀect of these shocks on stock returns,
and generate momentum and reversal.7 Under asymmetric information, momentum and reversal
arise conditional not only on past returns, as under symmetric information, but also on past cashﬂow
shocks. Moreover, asymmetric information generates new channels of comovement and lead-lag
eﬀects, as well as new eﬀects of idiosyncratic and commercial risk. For example, a new channel
of comovement is that a cashﬂow shock to one stock induces fund ﬂows which aﬀect the prices
of other stocks. And a new eﬀect of idiosyncratic risk is that cashﬂow shocks to stocks with
high idiosyncratic risk generate a higher discrepancy between the active and the index return, and
hence larger fund ﬂows. Despite these new eﬀects, the analysis of asymmetric information remains
tractable and has many formal similarities to that of symmetric information. For example, the
fund-ﬂow-driven component of the covariance matrix of returns under asymmetric information is
equal to its symmetric-information counterpart times a multiplicative scalar—which is larger than
one because of the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of fund ﬂows.
Momentum and reversal have mainly been derived in behavioral models.8 In Barberis, Shleifer
and Vishny (1998), momentum arises because investors view random-walk earnings as mean-
reverting and under-react to news. In Hong and Stein (1999), prices under-react to news because
information diﬀuses slowly across investors and those last to receive it do not infer it from prices.
In Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), overconﬁdent investors over-react to news be-
cause they underestimate the noise in their signals. Over-reaction builds up over time, leading to
momentum, because the self-attribution bias makes investors gradually more overconﬁdent.
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) is the behavioral model closest to our work. They assume that
stocks belong in styles and are traded between switchers, who over-extrapolate performance trends,
and fundamental investors. Following a stock’s bad performance, switchers become pessimistic
7The mechanism for ampliﬁcation is outlined in the third paragraph of the Introduction. The explanation in that
paragraph assumes asymmetric information, while the mechanism for momentum and reversal is broader and present
even under symmetric information (Section 4).
8Rational models of momentum include Berk, Green and Naik (1999), Johnson (2002) and Shin (2006), in which
good news about a ﬁrm increase uncertainty and so raise the expected return required by investors. Albuquerque and
Miao (2010) derive both momentum and reversal in a model where some investors receive a signal about dividends
that is positively correlated with the return on a private investment technology. When the signal is high, the price goes
up, but so does the investment in the technology. Since investors bear more risk overall, expected return increases.
4about the future performance of the corresponding style, and switch to other styles. Because the
extrapolation rule involves lags, switching is gradual and leads to momentum. Momentum requires
additionally that fundamental investors are myopic and do not anticipate the switchers’ ﬂows.
The equilibrium implications of delegated portfolio management are the subject of a growing
literature. In Shleifer and Vishny (1997), fund ﬂows are an exogenous function of the funds’ past
performance, and amplify the eﬀects of cashﬂow shocks. Ampliﬁcation eﬀects can also arise when
the equity stake of fund managers must exceed a lower bound because of optimal contracting under
moral hazard (He and Krishnamurthy 2009,2010), or when managers care about their reputation
(Guerreri and Kondor 2010).9 In Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2010), reputation concerns cause
managers to herd, and this generates momentum and reversal under the additional assumption
that the market makers trading with the managers are either monopolistic or myopic. In Basak
and Pavlova (2010), ﬂows by investors benchmarked against an index cause stocks in the index to
comove.10 Besides deriving momentum and reversal with competitive and rational agents, we con-
tribute to that literature methodologically by bringing the analysis of delegation within a tractable
normal-linear framework that can address a broad range of phenomena.
Finally, our emphasis on fund ﬂows as generators of comovement and momentum is consistent
with recent empirical ﬁndings. Coval and Staﬀord (2007) ﬁnd that mutual funds experiencing
large outﬂows engage in distressed selling of their stock portfolios. Anton and Polk (2010) and
Greenwood and Thesmar (2010) ﬁnd that comovement between stocks is larger when these are
held by many mutual funds in common, controlling for style characteristics. Lou (2010) predicts
ﬂows into mutual funds by the funds’ past performance, and imputes ﬂows into individual stocks
according to stocks’ weight in funds’ portfolios. He ﬁnds that ﬂows into stocks can explain up to
50% of stock-level momentum, especially for large stocks and in recent data where mutual funds
are more prevalent.
9Ampliﬁcation eﬀects can also arise when agents face margin constraints or have wealth-dependent risk aversion.
See the survey by Gromb and Vayanos (2010).
10Other models exploring equilibrium implications of delegated portfolio management include Brennan (1993),
Vayanos (2004), Dasgupta and Prat (2008), Petajisto (2009), Cuoco and Kaniel (2010), Kaniel and Kondor (2010)
and Malliaris and Yan (2010). See also Berk and Green (2004), in which fund ﬂows are driven by fund performance
because investors learn about managers’ ability, and feed back into performance because of exogenous decreasing
returns to managing a large fund.
52 Model
Time t is continuous and goes from zero to inﬁnity. There are N risky assets and a riskless asset.
We refer to the risky assets as stocks, but they could also be interpreted as industry-level portfolios,
asset classes, etc. The riskless asset has an exogenous, continuously compounded return r. The
stocks pay dividends over time, and their prices are determined endogenously in equilibrium. We
denote by Dnt the cumulative dividend per share of stock n = 1,..,N, and by Snt the stock’s
price. We specify the stochastic process for dividends later in this section. By possibly redeﬁning
dividends, we normalize the supply of each stock to one share.
A competitive investor can invest in the riskless asset and in the stocks. The investor can
access the stocks only through two investment funds. The ﬁrst fund is passively managed and
tracks mechanically the market index, i.e., holds stocks according to their supplies. Since all stocks
are in supply of one share, the index fund holds an equal number of shares of each stock. The
second fund is actively managed and selects an optimal portfolio in a way speciﬁed later in this
section. We assume two investment funds, rather than only one, so that we can examine ﬂows
between funds. The assumption that one of the funds is indexed avoids the diﬃculty of having to
solve for that fund’s optimal portfolio.
Flows between the two funds can occur only if the funds hold diﬀerent portfolios. To generate
diﬀerent portfolios, we assume that part of each stock’s supply is held by an exogenous set of agents
who do not trade. These agents could be the ﬁrm’s managers or founding families, or unmodeled
investors. We refer to them as buy-and-hold investors, and denote by 1−θn the number of shares of
stock n that they hold. The residual supply of stock n, left over from buy-and-hold investors, is θn
shares. This is absorbed by the index fund, which holds an equal number of shares of each stock,
and the active fund. If, therefore, residual supply diﬀers across stocks, the active fund holds a
diﬀerent portfolio than the index fund in equilibrium: it overweighs stocks in large residual supply
(high θn) and underweighs stocks in small residual supply (low θn). Moreover, the active portfolio
dominates the index portfolio. Indeed, since prices adjust in equilibrium so that the active fund is
induced to accommodate discrepancies in stocks’ residual supplies, stocks in large residual supply
(which are overweighed by the active fund) are cheap, while stocks in small residual supply (which
are underweighed) are expensive.
The investor determines how to allocate her wealth between the riskless asset, the index fund,





exp(−αct − βt)dt, (2.1)
where α is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, ct is consumption, and β is the discount rate.
The investor’s control variables are consumption ct and the number of shares xt and yt of the index
and active fund, respectively.
The active fund is run by a competitive manager, who can also invest his personal wealth in
the fund. The manager determines the active portfolio and the allocation of his wealth between the





exp(−¯ α¯ ct − ¯ βt)dt, (2.2)
where ¯ α is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, ¯ ct is consumption, and ¯ β is the discount rate.
The manager’s control variables are consumption ¯ ct, the number of shares ¯ yt of the active fund, and
the active portfolio zt ≡ (z1t,..,zNt), where znt denotes the number of shares of stock n included
in one share of the active fund.
Under the assumptions introduced so far, and in the absence of other frictions, the equilibrium
takes a simple form. As we show in Section 3, the investor holds stocks only through the active
fund since its portfolio dominates the index portfolio. As a consequence, the active fund holds
the entire residual supply of each stock, its portfolio is constant over time, and there are no ﬂows
between the two funds.
To generate fund ﬂows, we introduce an additional element into our model. We assume that
the investor’s return from the active fund is equal to the gross return, made of the dividends and
capital gains of the stocks held by the fund, net of a time-varying cost. We interpret this cost as a
managerial perk, and discuss additional interpretations later in this section.11 Empirical evidence
on the existence of a time-varying cost impacting the returns to fund investors is provided in a
number of papers.12 For simplicity, we assume that the index fund entails no cost, so its gross and
net returns coincide.
11An example of a managerial perk is late trading, whereby managers use their privileged access to the fund to
buy or sell fund shares at stale prices. Late trading was common in many funds and led to the 2003 mutual-fund
scandal. A related example is soft-dollar commissions, whereby funds inﬂate their brokerage commissions to pay for
services that mainly beneﬁt managers, e.g., promote the fund to new investors, or facilitate managers’ late trading.
12Empirical papers measure the cost by the return gap, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a mutual fund’s return
over a given quarter and the return of a hypothetical portfolio invested in the stocks that the fund holds at the
beginning of the quarter. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zhang (2008) show that the return gap varies signiﬁcantly across
7We model the cost as a ﬂow (i.e., the cost between t and t+dt is of order dt), and assume that
the ﬂow cost is proportional to the number of shares yt that the investor holds in the active fund.
We denote the coeﬃcient of proportionality by Ct and assume that it follows the process
dCt = κ( ¯ C − Ct)dt + sdBC
t , (2.3)
where κ is a mean-reversion parameter, ¯ C is a long-run mean, s is a positive scalar, and BC
t is a
Brownian motion. The mean-reversion of Ct is not essential for momentum and reversal, which
occur even when κ = 0.
We allow the manager to derive a beneﬁt from the investor’s participation in the active fund.
This beneﬁt can be interpreted as a managerial perk or a fee. We model the beneﬁt in the same
way as the cost, i.e., a ﬂow which is proportional to the number of shares yt that the investor holds
in the active fund. If the cost is a perk that the manager can extract eﬃciently, then the coeﬃcient
of proportionality for the beneﬁt is Ct. We allow more generally the coeﬃcient of proportionality
to be λCt +B, where λ and B are scalars. The parameter λ can be interpreted as the eﬃciency of
perk extraction, while the parameter B can derive from a constant fee.13
Varying the parameters λ and B generates a rich speciﬁcation of the manager’s objective.
When λ = B = 0, the manager cares about fund performance only through his personal investment
in the fund, and his objective is similar to the fund investor’s. When instead λ and B are positive,
the manager is also concerned with commercial risk, i.e., the risk that the investor might reduce her
participation in the fund. The parameters λ and B are not essential for momentum and reversal,
which occur even when λ = B = 0. As we show in later sections, λ aﬀects the size of momentum
relative to reversal, while B aﬀects only the average mispricing.
The cost and beneﬁt are assumed proportional to yt for analytical convenience. At the same
time, these variables are sensitive to how shares of the active fund are deﬁned (e.g., they change
with a stock split). We deﬁne one share of the fund by the requirement that its market value equals
the equilibrium market value of the entire fund. Under this deﬁnition, the number of fund shares
funds and over time, and is persistent with a half-life of about three years. The high persistence indicates that the
return gap is linked to underlying fund characteristics—and there is indeed a correlation with fund-speciﬁc measures
of agency costs and trading costs. Because of its signiﬁcant cross-sectional variation and persistence, the return gap
a good forecaster of future returns: funds whose return gap is in the top decile outperform the market by an average
1.2% over the next year, while funds in the bottom decile underperform by 2.2%. Earlier studies that use the return
gap and link it to fund characteristics include Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Wermers (2000).
13If, for example, the cost Ctyt is the sum of a fee Fyt and a perk (Ct − F)yt, and the manager can extract a
fraction λ of the perk, then the beneﬁt is
[F + λ(Ct − F)]yt = [λCt + (1 − λ)F]yt,
which has the assumed form with B = (1 − λ)F.
8held by the investor and the manager in equilibrium sum to one, i.e.,
yt + ¯ yt = 1. (2.4)
We deﬁne one share of the index fund to consist of one share of each stock, and refer to the
corresponding vector 1 ≡ (1,..,1) as the market portfolio. We refer to the vector θ ≡ (θ1,..,θN) of
the stocks’ residual supplies as the residual-supply portfolio. We deﬁne the constant
∆ ≡ θΣθ′1Σ1′ − (1Σθ′)2,
which is positive and becomes zero when the vectors 1 and θ are collinear.
The manager observes all the variables in the model. The investor observes the returns and
share prices of the index and active funds, but not the same variables for the individual stocks.
We study both the case of symmetric information, where the investor observes the cost Ct, and
that of asymmetric information, where Ct is observable only by the manager. In the asymmetric-
information case, the investor seeks to infer Ct from the returns and share prices of the index and
active funds. The symmetric-information case is simpler analytically and delivers most of our main
results, including momentum and reversal. The asymmetric-information case is more realistic and
delivers some additional results.
We denote the vector of stocks’ cumulative dividends by Dt ≡ (D1t,..,DNt)′ and the vector of
stock prices by St ≡ (S1t,..,SNt)′, where v′ denotes the transpose of the vector v. We assume that
Dt follows the process
dDt = Ftdt + σdBD
t , (2.5)
where Ft ≡ (F1t,..,FNt)′ is a time-varying drift equal to the instantaneous expected dividend, σ is a
constant matrix of diﬀusion coeﬃcients, and BD
t is a d-dimensional Brownian motion independent
of BC
t . The expected dividend Ft is observable only by the manager. Time-variation in Ft is not
essential in the symmetric-information case, where momentum and reversal occur even when Ft
is a constant parameter known to the investor. Time-variation in Ft becomes essential for the
analysis of asymmetric information: with a constant Ft, the investor would infer Ct perfectly from
the share price of the active fund, and information would be symmetric. We model time-variation
in Ft through the process
dFt = κ( ¯ F − Ft)dt + φσdBF
t (2.6)
9where the mean-reversion parameter κ is the same as for Ct for simplicity, ¯ F is a long-run mean, φ
is a positive scalar, and BF
t is a d-dimensional Brownian motion independent of BC
t and BD
t . The
diﬀusion matrices for Dt and Ft are proportional for simplicity.
We ﬁnally comment on the assumption that the manager can invest his personal wealth in
the active fund. This assumption generates a simple objective that the manager maximizes when
choosing the fund’s portfolio.14 It also ensures that the manager acts as trading counterparty to
the investor: when Ct increases and the investor reduces her holdings of the active fund, eﬀectively
selling the stocks held by the fund, the manager takes the other side by raising his stake in the
fund. Under the alternative assumption that the manager must invest his personal wealth in the
riskless asset, we would need to introduce additional “smart-money” investors who could access
stocks directly and act as counterparty to the fund investor. This would complicate the model
without changing the basic mechanisms.
Note that in a model with smart-money investors, additional interpretations of the cost are
possible. Two interpretations not emphasized so far are an operational cost (e.g., trading cost)
and a reduced form for low managerial stock-picking ability. These additional interpretations are
not consistent with the assumption that the manager can invest his personal wealth in the active
fund. Indeed, the cost would then impact not only the investor’s holdings in the fund yt, as we
are assuming, but also the manager’s holdings ¯ yt. The additional interpretations, however, are
consistent with a model with smart-money investors: since these investors do not invest in the
active fund, their investments are not aﬀected by the cost.
3 Symmetric Information
This section solves the model presented in the previous section in the case of symmetric information,
where the cost Ct is observable by both the investor and the manager. We look for an equilibrium





Ft − ¯ F
r + κ
− (a0 + a1Ct), (3.1)
14Restricting the manager not to invest his personal wealth in the index fund is also in the spirit of generating a
simple objective. Indeed, in the absence of this restriction, the active portfolio would be indeterminate: the manager
could mix a given active portfolio with the index, and make that the new active portfolio, while achieving the same
personal portfolio through an oﬀsetting short position in the index. Note that restricting the manager not to invest
in the index only weakly constrains his personal portfolio since he can always modify the portfolio of the active fund
and his stake in that fund.
10where (a0,a1) are constant vectors. The ﬁrst two terms are the present value of expected dividends,
discounted at the riskless rate r, and the last term is a risk premium linear in Ct. As we show later
in this section, the risk premium moves in response to fund ﬂows. The investor’s holdings of the
active fund in our conjectured equilibrium are
yt = b0 − b1Ct, (3.2)
where (b0,b1) are constants. We expect b1 to be positive, i.e., the investor reduces her holdings of
the fund when Ct is high. We refer to an equilibrium satisfying (3.1) and (3.2) as linear.
3.1 Manager’s Optimization
The manager chooses the active fund’s portfolio zt, the number ¯ yt of fund shares that he owns, and
consumption ¯ ct. The manager’s budget constraint is
dWt = rWtdt + ¯ ytzt(dDt + dSt − rStdt) + (λCt + B)ytdt − ¯ ctdt. (3.3)
The ﬁrst term is the return from the riskless asset, the second term is the return from the active
fund in excess of the riskless asset, the third term is the manager’s beneﬁt from the investor’s
participation in the fund, and the fourth term is consumption. To compute the return from the
active fund, we note that since one share of the fund corresponds to zt shares of the stocks,
the manager’s eﬀective stock holdings are ¯ ytzt shares. These holdings are multiplied by the vector
dRt ≡ dDt+dSt−rStdt of the stocks’ excess returns per share (referred to as returns, for simplicity).
Using (2.3), (2.5), (2.6) and (3.1), we can write the vector of returns as
dRt =
 





















where f ≡ 1 + φ2/(r + κ)2 and Σ ≡ σσ′. The matrix fΣ represents the covariance driven purely
by dividend (i.e., cashﬂow) news, and we refer to it as fundamental covariance. The matrix s2a1a′
1
represents the additional covariance introduced by fund ﬂows, and we refer to it as non-fundamental
covariance.
11The manager’s optimization problem is to choose controls (¯ ct, ¯ yt,zt) to maximize the expected
utility (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (3.3) and the investor’s holding policy (3.2). The
active fund’s portfolio zt satisﬁes, in addition, the normalization
ztSt = (θ − xt1)St. (3.6)
This is because one share of the active fund is deﬁned so that its market value equals the equilibrium
market value of the entire fund. Moreover, the latter is (θ−xt1)St because in equilibrium the active
fund holds the residual-supply portfolio θ minus the investor’s holdings xt1 of the index fund. We
conjecture that the manager’s value function is















−exp(−¯ α¯ ct) + D¯ V − ¯ β ¯ V
 
= 0, (3.8)
where D¯ V is the drift of the process ¯ V under the controls (¯ ct, ¯ yt,zt). Proposition 3.1 shows that
the value function (3.7) satisﬁes the Bellman equation if (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q11) satisfy a system of three scalar
equations.
Proposition 3.1 The value function (3.7) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (3.8) if (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q11) satisfy
a system of three scalar equations.
In the proof of Proposition 3.1 we show that the optimization over (¯ ct, ¯ yt,zt) can be reduced
to optimization over the manager’s consumption ¯ ct and eﬀective stock holdings ˆ zt ≡ ¯ ytzt. Given
ˆ zt, the decomposition between ¯ yt and zt is determined by the normalization (3.6). The ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to ˆ zt is
Et(dRt) = r¯ αCovt(dRt, ˆ ztdRt) + (¯ q1 + ¯ q11Ct)Covt(dRt,dCt). (3.9)
Eq. (3.9) links expected stock returns to the risk faced by the manager. The expected return that
the manager requires from a stock depends on the stock’s covariance with the manager’s portfolio
ˆ zt (ﬁrst term in the right-hand side), and on the covariance with changes to the cost Ct (second
term). The latter eﬀect reﬂects a hedging demand by the manager. We derive the implications of
(3.9) for the cross section of expected returns later in this section.
123.2 Investor’s Optimization
The investor chooses a number of shares xt in the index fund and yt in the active fund, and
consumption ct. The investor’s budget constraint is
dWt = rWtdt + xt1dRt + yt (ztdRt − Ctdt) − ctdt. (3.10)
The ﬁrst three terms are the returns from the riskless asset, the index fund, and the active fund
(net of the cost Ct), and the fourth term is consumption. The investor’s optimization problem is to
choose controls (ct,xt,yt) to maximize the expected utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraint
(3.10). The investor takes the active fund’s portfolio zt as given and equal to its equilibrium value
θ − xt1. We conjecture that the investor’s value function is











where (q0,q1,q11) are constants. The Bellman equation is
max
ct,xt,yt
[−exp(−αct) + DV − βV ] = 0, (3.12)
where DV is the drift of the process V under the controls (ct,xt,yt). Proposition 3.2 shows that the
value function (3.11) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (3.12) if (q0,q1,q11) satisfy a system of three
scalar equations. The proposition shows additionally that the optimal control yt is linear in Ct, as
conjectured in (3.2).
Proposition 3.2 The value function (3.11) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (3.12) if (q0,q1,q11)
satisfy a system of three scalar equations. The optimal control yt is linear in Ct.
In the proof of Proposition 3.2, we show that the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to xt and
yt are
Et(1dRt) = rαCovt [1dRt,(xt1 + ytzt)dRt] + (q1 + q11Ct)Covt(1dRt,dCt), (3.13)
Et(ztdRt) − Ctdt = rαCovt [ztdRt,(xt1 + ytzt)dRt] + (q1 + q11Ct)Covt(ztdRt,dCt), (3.14)
respectively. Eqs. (3.13) and (3.14) are analogous to the manager’s ﬁrst-order condition (3.9) in that
they equate expected returns to risk. The diﬀerence with (3.9) is that the investor is constrained to
two portfolios rather than N individual stocks. Eq. (3.9) is a vector equation with N components,
while (3.13) and (3.14) are scalar equations derived by pre-multiplying expected returns with the
vectors 1 and zt of index- and active-fund weights. Note that the investor’s expected return from
the active fund in (3.14) is net of the cost Ct.
133.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the active fund’s portfolio zt is equal to θ−xt1, and the shares held by the manager
and the investor sum to one. Combining these equations with the ﬁrst-order conditions (3.9),
(3.13) and (3.14), and the value-function equations (Propositions 3.1 and 3.2), yields a system
of equations characterizing a linear equilibrium. Proposition 3.3 shows that a linear equilibrium
exists, and determines a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness.




where γ1 is a positive constant and
pf ≡ θ −
1Σθ′
1Σ1′1 (3.16)
is the “ﬂow portfolio.” There exists a unique linear equilibrium if λ < ¯ λ for a constant ¯ λ > 0.15
Proposition 3.3 can be specialized to the benchmark case of costless delegation, where the
investor’s cost Ct of investing in the active fund is constant and equal to zero. This case can be
derived by setting Ct, as well as its long-run mean ¯ C and diﬀusion coeﬃcient s, to zero.
Corollary 3.1 (Costless Delegation) When Ct = ¯ C = s = 0, the investor holds yt = ¯ α/(α+ ¯ α)




α + ¯ α
Σθ′dt =
rα¯ α
α + ¯ α
Covt(dRt,θdRt), (3.17)
with the factor being the residual-supply portfolio θ.
The investor holds only the active fund because it oﬀers a superior portfolio than the index fund
at no cost. The relative shares of the investor and the manager in the active fund are determined
15We conjecture that uniqueness holds even if λ ≥ ¯ λ. Moreover, most of the properties that we derive hold in any
linear equilibrium: this applies, for example, to (3.15) and γ1 > 0, as we show in the proof of Proposition 3.3, and to
Corollaries 3.2-3.6.
14by their risk-aversion coeﬃcients, according to optimal risk-sharing. Stocks’ expected returns are
determined by the covariance with the residual-supply portfolio. The intuition for the latter result
is that since the index fund receives zero investment, the residual-supply portfolio coincides with the
active portfolio zt, which is also the portfolio held by the manager. Since the manager determines
the cross section of expected returns through the ﬁrst-order condition (3.9), and there is no hedging
demand because Ct is constant, the residual-supply portfolio is the only pricing factor. Note that
when Ct = ¯ C = s = 0, expected returns are constant over time. Thus, return predictability can
arise only because of time-variation in Ct. We next allow Ct to vary over time, and determine the
eﬀects on fund ﬂows, prices and expected returns.
Corollary 3.2 (Fund Flows) The change in the investor’s eﬀective stock holdings, caused by a




Following an increase in the cost Ct of investing in the active fund, the investor ﬂows out
of that fund and into the index fund. The net change in the investor’s eﬀective stock holdings
is proportional to the ﬂow portfolio pf, deﬁned in (3.16). This portfolio consists of the residual-
supply portfolio θ, plus a position in the market portfolio 1 that renders the covariance with the
market equal to zero.16 The intuition why the ﬂow portfolio characterizes fund ﬂows is as follows.
Following an increase in Ct, the investor reduces her investment in the active fund, thus selling
a slice of the residual-supply portfolio. She also increases her investment in the index fund, thus
buying a slice of the market portfolio. Because investing in the index fund is costless, the investor
maintains a constant overall exposure to the market. Therefore, the net change in her portfolio is
uncorrelated with the market, which means that she is selling a slice of the ﬂow portfolio.
In selling a slice of the ﬂow portfolio, the investor is eﬀectively selling some stocks and buying
others. The stocks being sold are in large residual supply and correspond to long positions in the
ﬂow portfolio, while the stocks being bought are in small residual supply and correspond to short
positions. Thus, when the investor ﬂows out of the active fund and into the index fund, she sells
stocks that the active fund overweighs relative to the index fund, and buys stocks that the active
fund underweighs.
16The zero covariance between the market and the ﬂow portfolio follows from the more general result of Corollary
3.3: premultiply the last equality in (3.19) by 1 and note that 1ǫt = 0.
15Corollary 3.3 (Prices) The change in stock prices, caused by a change in Ct, is proportional to

















where dǫt ≡ (dǫ1t,..,dǫNt)′ denotes the residual from a regression of stock returns dRt on the market
return 1dRt.
An increase in Ct lowers the prices of stocks that covary positively with the ﬂow portfolio and
raises the prices of stocks covarying negatively. This price impact arises because of two distinct
mechanisms: an intuitive mechanism involving fund ﬂows, and a more subtle mechanism involving
the manager’s hedging demand that we discuss at the end of this section. The fund-ﬂows mechanism
is as follows. When Ct increases, the investor sells a slice of the ﬂow portfolio, which is acquired by
the manager. As a result, the manager requires higher expected returns from stocks that covary
positively with the ﬂow portfolio, and the price of these stocks decreases. Conversely, the expected
returns of stocks that covary negatively with the ﬂow portfolio decrease, and their price increases.
A stock’s covariance with the ﬂow portfolio can be characterized in terms of idiosyncratic risk.
The last equality in Corollary 3.3 implies that the covariance is positive if the stock’s idiosyncratic
movement dǫnt (i.e., the part of its return that is orthogonal to the index) covaries positively with
the idiosyncratic movement of the ﬂow portfolio. This is likely to occur when the stock is in large
residual supply, because it then corresponds to a long position in the ﬂow portfolio. Thus, stocks in
large residual supply, which the active fund overweighs, are likely to drop when the investor ﬂows
out of the active fund and into the index fund. Conversely, stocks in small residual supply, which
the active fund underweighs, are likely to rise.
While residual supply inﬂuences the sign of a stock’s covariance with the ﬂow portfolio, idiosyn-
cratic risk inﬂuences the magnitude: stocks with high idiosyncratic risk have higher covariance with
the ﬂow portfolio in absolute value, and are therefore more aﬀected by changes in Ct. The intuition
can be seen from the extreme case of a stock with no idiosyncratic risk. Since changes in Ct do
not change the investor’s overall exposure to the market, they also do not change her willingness
to carry market risk. Therefore, they do not aﬀect the price of the market portfolio, or of a stock
carrying only market risk.
Since changes in Ct, and the fund ﬂows they trigger, aﬀect prices, they contribute to comove-
ment between stocks. Recall from (3.5) that the covariance matrix of stock returns is the sum of a
16fundamental covariance, driven purely by cashﬂows, and a non-fundamental covariance, introduced
by fund ﬂows. Using Proposition 3.3, we can compute the non-fundamental covariance.









The non-fundamental covariance is positive for stock pairs whose covariance with the ﬂow portfolio
has the same sign, and is negative otherwise.
The non-fundamental covariance between a pair of stocks is proportional to the product of
the covariances between each stock in the pair and the ﬂow portfolio. It is thus large in absolute
value when the stocks have high idiosyncratic risk, because they are more aﬀected by changes in
Ct. Moreover, it can be positive or negative: positive for stock pairs whose covariance with the
ﬂow portfolio has the same sign, and negative otherwise. Intuitively, two stocks move in the same
direction in response to fund ﬂows if they are both overweighed or both underweighed by the active
fund, but move in opposite directions if one is overweighed and the other underweighed.
The eﬀect of Ct on expected returns goes in the opposite direction than the eﬀect on prices.
We next determine more generally the cross section of expected returns.
Corollary 3.5 (Expected Returns) Stocks’ expected returns are given by the two-factor model
Et(dRt) =
rα¯ α
α + ¯ α
1Σθ′
1Σ1′Covt(dRt,1dRt) + ΛtCovt(dRt,pfdRt), (3.21)
with the factors being the market and the ﬂow portfolio. The factor risk premium Λt associated to
the ﬂow portfolio is
Λt =
rα¯ α









(r + κ)Ct −
s2(α¯ q1 + ¯ αq1)
α + ¯ α
 
. (3.22)
The presence of the ﬂow portfolio as a priced factor can be viewed as a mispricing relative to a
CAPM in which the only factor is the market portfolio. The factor risk premium Λt associated to
the ﬂow portfolio measures the severity of the mispricing. Note that the mispricing exists even when
delegation is costless (and it is because of this mispricing that the active fund is attractive to the
investor). Indeed, Corollary 3.1 shows that with costless delegation, expected returns are described
17by a one-factor model, with the factor being the residual-supply portfolio rather than the market.
This one-factor model is also implied from Corollary 3.5. Indeed, setting Ct = ¯ C = s = 0 in (3.22),
we ﬁnd that the risk premia associated to the two factors are constant over time, and therefore
the two factors can be reduced to one. Moreover, the factor risk premium Λt, which measures the
mispricing, is positive. When Ct varies over time, so does Λt, and the two factors cannot be reduced
to one. An increase in Ct raises Λt and renders the mispricing more severe: stocks overweighed
by the active fund become more underpriced and their expected returns increase, while stocks
underweighed by the active fund become more overpriced and their expected returns decrease.
Note that changes in Ct are the only driver of time-variation in expected returns.
The time-variation in expected returns gives rise to predictability. We examine predictability
based on past returns. As in the rest of our analysis, we evaluate returns over an inﬁnitesimal
time period; returns thus concern a single point in time. We compute the covariance between
the vector of returns at time t and the same vector at time t′ > t. Corollary 3.6 shows that this
autocovariance matrix is equal to the non-fundamental (contemporaneous) covariance matrix times
a negative scalar.
Corollary 3.6 (Return Predictability) The covariance between stock returns at time t and
those at time t′ > t is
Covt(dRt,dR′
t′) = −s2(r + κ)γ2
1e−κ(t′−t)Σp′
fpfΣ(dt)2. (3.23)
A stock’s return predicts negatively the stock’s subsequent return (return reversal). It predicts
negatively the subsequent return of another stock when the covariance between each stock in the pair
and the ﬂow portfolio has the same sign (negative lead-lag eﬀect), and positively otherwise (positive
lead-lag eﬀect).
Since the diagonal elements of the autocovariance matrix are negative, stocks exhibit negative
autocovariance, i.e., return reversal. This is because expected returns vary over time only in
response to changes in Ct, and these changes move prices in the opposite direction. Thus, a lower-
than-expected price predicts a higher-than-expected subsequent return, and vice-versa.
The non-diagonal elements of the autocovariance matrix characterize lead-lag eﬀects, i.e.,
whether the past return of one stock predicts the future return of another. Lead-lag eﬀects are
negative for stock pairs whose covariance with the ﬂow portfolio has the same sign, and are positive
otherwise. For example, when the sign is the same, changes in Ct move the prices of both stocks in
18the same direction and their expected returns in the opposite direction. Therefore, a lower-than-
expected price of one stock predicts a higher-than-expected subsequent return of the other, and
vice-versa.
We next examine how prices and expected returns depend on the manager’s concern with
commercial risk, i.e., the risk that the investor might reduce her participation in the fund. Recall
that the manager derives the beneﬁt (λCt + B)yt from the investor’s participation, where yt is the
number of shares owned by the investor, λ is the eﬃciency of perk extraction, and B is a fee.
Corollary 3.7 (Commercial Risk) An increase in λ raises γ1, and thus increases the non-
fundamental volatility of stock returns and the extent of return reversal. An increase in B has
no eﬀect on γ1, but raises Λt, and thus increases the average mispricing.
Since B raises Λt, it exacerbates the mispricing that the active fund seeks to exploit: stocks
that the active fund overweighs become more underpriced, while stocks that it underweighs become
more overpriced. Thus, a manager concerned with losing his fee is less willing to trade against
mispricings. A common intuition for this result is that the manager fears that mispricings might
worsen, in which case the fund will perform poorly and outﬂows will occur.17 In the symmetric-
information case, where the investor observes Ct, the causality is not from performance to ﬂows, as
the previous intuition requires, but from ﬂows to performance: an increase in Ct triggers outﬂows
from the active fund, and the negative price pressure these exert on the stocks that the fund
overweighs impairs fund performance. The intuition for the eﬀect of B is diﬀerent as well: a
manager concerned with losing his fee seeks to hedge against increases in Ct since these trigger
outﬂows. Hedging requires the manager to hold stocks that perform well when Ct increases. These
are the stocks that the active fund underweighs, and the manager’s hedging demand renders these
stocks more overpriced.
The parameter B has an eﬀect only on the average mispricing, but not on how the mispricing
varies with Ct. By contrast, λ renders the mispricing more sensitive to Ct, i.e., raises γ1. Indeed,
λ > 0 implies that when Ct increases, the manager can extract a larger perk from each share
of the fund held by the investor, and is therefore more willing to hedge against future changes
in Ct. Thus, an increase in Ct not only generates outﬂows, but also makes the manager more
17This is, for example, the mechanism in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who assume that fund ﬂows are an exogenous
function of fund performance. Causality from performance to ﬂows is endogenous in our model, and arises in the
asymmetric-information case, where the investor does not observe Ct and seeks to infer it from fund performance. In
the asymmetric-information case, B raises Λt because of a mechanism similar to that in Shleifer and Vishny.
19concerned with future outﬂows.18 As a consequence, the manager’s hedging demand increases, and
this adds to the mispricing caused by current outﬂows. Note that since λ raises γ1, it also increases
non-fundamental volatility and comovement (Corollary 3.4), as well as return reversal (Corollary
3.6). Thus, the manager’s demand to hedge against outﬂows can have the perverse eﬀect to render
returns more volatile.
4 Gradual Adjustment
Section 3 shows that returns exhibit reversal at any horizon. To generate short-run momentum
and long-run reversal, we need the additional assumption that fund ﬂows exhibit inertia, i.e., the
investor can adjust her fund holdings to new information only gradually. Gradual adjustment can
result from contractual restrictions or institutional decision lags.19 We model these frictions as a
ﬂow cost ψ(dyt/dt)2/2 that the investor must incur when changing the number yt of active-fund
shares that she owns. The advantage of the quadratic cost over other formulations (such as an
upper bound on |dyt/dt|) is that it preserves the linearity of the model.
We maintain the assumption that information about Ct is symmetric, and look for an equilib-





Ft − ¯ F
r + κ
− (a0 + a1Ct + a2yt), (4.1)
where (a0,a1,a2) are constant vectors. The number yt of active-fund shares that the investor owns
becomes a state variable and aﬀects prices since it cannot be set instantaneously to its optimal
level. The investor’s speed of adjustment vt ≡ dyt/dt in our conjectured equilibrium is
vt = b0 − b1Ct − b2yt, (4.2)
where (b0,b1,b2) are constants. We expect (b1,b2) to be positive, i.e., the investor reduces her
investment in the active fund faster when Ct or yt are large. We refer to an equilibrium satisfying
(4.1) and (4.2) as linear.
18The same eﬀect would arise under the non-perk interpretations of the cost, discussed at the end of Section 2, if
the manager’s beneﬁt is assumed concave in the number of shares yt owned by the investor.
19An example of contractual restrictions is lock-up periods, often imposed by hedge funds, which require investors
not to withdraw capital for a pre-speciﬁed time period. Institutional decision lags can arise for investors such as
pension funds, foundations or endowments, where decisions are made by boards of trustees that meet infrequently.
The inertia in capital ﬂows and its relevance for asset prices are emphasized in Duﬃe’s (2010) presidential address
to the American Finance Association.
204.1 Optimization
The manager chooses controls (¯ ct, ¯ yt,zt) to maximize the expected utility (2.2) subject to the budget
constraint (3.3), the normalization (3.6), and the investor’s holding policy (4.2). Since stock prices
depend on (Ct,yt), the same is true for the manager’s value function. We conjecture that the value
function is








t ¯ Q ¯ Xt
  
, (4.3)
where ¯ Xt ≡ (Ct,yt)′, (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q2) are constants, and ¯ Q is a constant symmetric 2 × 2 matrix.
Proposition 4.1 The value function (4.3) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (3.8) if (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ Q)
satisfy a system of six scalar equations.
The investor chooses controls (ct,xt,vt) to maximize the expected utility (2.1) subject to the
budget constraint




tdt − ctdt (4.4)
and the manager’s portfolio policy zt = θ −xt1. We study this optimization problem in two steps.
In a ﬁrst step, we optimize over (ct,xt), assuming that vt is given by (4.2). We solve this problem
using dynamic programming, and conjecture the value function















[−exp(−αct) + DV − βV ] = 0, (4.6)
where DV is the drift of the process V under the controls (ct,xt). In a second step, we derive
conditions under which the control vt given by (4.2) is optimal.
Proposition 4.2 The value function (4.5) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (4.6) if (q0,q1,q2,Q)
satisfy a system of six scalar equations. The control vt given by (4.2) is optimal if (b0,b1,b2) satisfy
a system of three scalar equations.
214.2 Equilibrium
The system of equations characterizing a linear equilibrium is higher-dimensional than under in-
stantaneous adjustment, and so more complicated. Proposition 4.3 shows that a unique linear
equilibrium exists when the diﬀusion coeﬃcient s of Ct is small. This is done by computing explic-
itly the linear equilibrium for s = 0 and applying the implicit function theorem. Our numerical
solutions for general values of s seem to generate a unique linear equilibrium. Moreover, the prop-
erties that we derive for small s in the rest of this section seem to hold for general values of s.20
Proposition 4.3 For small s, there exists a unique linear equilibrium. The constants (b1,b2) are
positive, and the vectors (a1,a2) are given by
ai = γiΣp′
f, (4.7)
where γ1 is a positive and γ2 a negative constant. Eq. (4.7) holds in any linear equilibrium for
general values of s.
Since γ1 > 0, an increase in Ct lowers the prices of stocks that covary positively with the
ﬂow portfolio and raises the prices of stocks covarying negatively. This eﬀect is the same as
under instantaneous adjustment (Corollary 3.3) but the mechanism is slightly diﬀerent. Under
instantaneous adjustment, an increase in Ct triggers an immediate outﬂow from the active fund
by the investor. In ﬂowing out of the fund, the investor sells the stocks that the fund overweighs,
and the prices of these stocks drop so that the manager is induced to buy them. Under gradual
adjustment, the outﬂow is expected to occur in the future, and so are the sales of the stocks that
the fund overweighs. The prices of these stocks drop immediately in anticipation of the future sales.
We next examine how Ct impacts stocks’ expected returns. As in the case of instantaneous
adjustment, expected returns are given by a two-factor model, with the factors being the market
and the ﬂow portfolio. The key diﬀerence with instantaneous adjustment lies in the properties of
the factor risk premium associated with the ﬂow portfolio.
Corollary 4.1 (Expected Returns) Stocks’ expected returns are given by the two-factor model
(3.21), with the factors being the market and the ﬂow portfolio. The factor risk premium Λt
20This applies to b1 > 0, b2 > 0, γ1 > 0, γ2 < 0, and to Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 (with a diﬀerent threshold λ
R).
22associated to the ﬂow portfolio is
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and is positive otherwise, and the constant γR
2 is negative.
When γR
1 < 0, the eﬀect of Ct on expected returns goes in the same direction as the eﬀect on
prices. For example, an increase in Ct not only lowers the prices of stocks that covary positively
with the ﬂow portfolio, but also lowers their subsequent expected returns. This seems paradoxical:
given that Ct does not aﬀect cash ﬂows, shouldn’t the drop in price be accompanied by an increase
in expected return? The explanation is that while expected return decreases in the short run, it
increases in the long run, in response to the gradual outﬂows triggered by the increase in Ct.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic behavior of fund ﬂows and expected returns following a shock
to Ct at time t. We assume that the shock is positive, and trace its eﬀects for t′ > t. We set
the realized values of all shocks occurring subsequent to time t to zero: given the linearity of our
model, this amounts to taking expectations over the future shocks. To better illustrate the main
eﬀects, we assume no mean-reversion in Ct, i.e., κ = 0. Thus, the shock to Ct generates an equal
increase in Ct′ for all t′ > t. We assume parameter values for which the constant γR
1 of Corollary
4.1 is negative. The constant γR
2 is also negative for these parameter values, a result which our
numerical solutions suggest is general.
The solid line in Figure 1 plots the investor’s holdings of the active fund, yt′. Holdings decrease
to a lower constant level, and the decrease happens gradually because of the adjustment cost.
The dashed line in Figure 1 plots the instantaneous expected return E(dRt′)/dt of a stock that
covaries positively with the ﬂow portfolio. Immediately following the increase in Ct, expected
return decreases because γR
1 < 0. Over time, however, as outﬂows occur, expected return increases.
This is because the manager must be induced to absorb the outﬂows and buy the stock—an eﬀect
which can also be seen from Corollary 4.1 by noting that yt′ decreases over time and γR
2 < 0. The
increase in expected return eventually overtakes the initial decrease, and the overall eﬀect becomes








Figure 1: Eﬀect of a positive shock to Ct on the investor’s holdings of the active
fund yt′ (solid line) and on the instantaneous expected return E(dRt′)/dt of a stock
that covaries positively with the ﬂow portfolio (dashed line) for t′ > t. Time is
measured in years. The ﬁgure is drawn for (r,κ, ¯ α/α,ψ/α,φ2,∆/(1Σ1′),s2,λ) =
(0.04,0,4,4,0.1,0.1,1,0). The equations describing the dynamics of yt′ and
E(dRt′)/dt are derived in the proof of Corollary 4.2.
an increase. It is the long-run increase in expected return that causes the initial price drop at time
t.
While Figure 1 reconciles the initial price drop with the behavior of expected return, it does
not explain why expected return decreases in the short run. The latter eﬀect is, in fact, puzzling:
why is the manager willing to hold at time t—and even overweigh—a stock that is expected to
underperform in the short run? The intuition is that the manager prefers to guarantee a “bird
in the hand.” Indeed, the anticipation of future outﬂows causes the stock to become underpriced
at time t and oﬀer an attractive return over a long horizon. The manager could earn an even
more attractive return, on average, by buying the stock after the outﬂows occur. This, however,
exposes him to the risk that the outﬂows might not occur, in which case the stock would cease to
be underpriced. Thus, the manager might prefer to guarantee an attractive long-horizon return
(bird in the hand), and pass up on the opportunity to exploit an uncertain short-run price drop.
Note that in seeking to guarantee the long-horizon return, the manager is, in eﬀect, causing the
short-run drop. Indeed, the manager’s buying pressure prevents the price at time t from dropping
to a level that fully reﬂects the future outﬂows, i.e., from which a short-run drop is not expected.
24The bird-in-the-hand eﬀect can be seen formally in the manager’s ﬁrst-order condition (3.9),
which in the case of gradual adjustment becomes
Et(dRt) = r¯ αCovt(dRt, ˆ ztdRt) + (¯ q1 + ¯ q11Ct + ¯ q12yt)Covt(dRt,dCt). (4.10)
Following an increase in Ct, the expected return of a stock that covaries positively with the ﬂow
portfolio decreases, lowering the left-hand side of (4.10). Therefore, the manager remains willing to
hold the stock only if its risk, described by the right-hand side of (4.10), also decreases. The decrease
in risk is not caused by a lower covariance between the stock and the manager’s portfolio ˆ zt (ﬁrst
term in the right-hand side). Indeed, since outﬂows are gradual, ˆ zt remains constant immediately
following the increase in Ct. The decrease in risk is instead driven by the manager’s hedging demand
(second term in the right-hand side), which means that a stock covarying positively with the ﬂow
portfolio becomes a better hedge for the manager when Ct increases. The intuition is that when
Ct increases, mispricing becomes severe, and the manager has attractive investment opportunities.
Hedging against a reduction in these opportunities requires holding stocks that perform well when
Ct decreases, and these are the stocks covarying positively with the ﬂow portfolio. Holding such
stocks guarantees the manager an attractive long-horizon return—the bird-in-the-hand eﬀect.
The manager’s hedging demand is inﬂuenced not only by the bird-in-the-hand eﬀect, but also
by the concern with commercial risk (Corollary 3.7). The two eﬀects work in opposite directions
when λ > 0. Indeed, a stock covarying positively with the ﬂow portfolio is a bad hedge for the
manager because it performs poorly when Ct increases, which is also when outﬂows occur. Moreover,
λ > 0 implies that the hedge tends to worsen when Ct increases because the manager becomes
more concerned with future outﬂows. When λ is small, the bird-in-the-hand eﬀect dominates the
commercial-risk eﬀect in inﬂuencing how the manager’s hedging demand depends on Ct. Thus,
when λ is small, changes in Ct impact prices and short-run expected returns in the same direction
(γR
1 < 0), as Corollary 4.1 conﬁrms in the case of small s.21
The time-variation in expected returns implied by Corollary 4.1 gives rise to predictability.
As in the case of instantaneous adjustment, the autocovariance matrix of returns is equal to the
non-fundamental covariance matrix times a scalar. But while the scalar is negative for all lags
under instantaneous adjustment, it can be positive for short lags under gradual adjustment.
Corollary 4.2 (Return Predictability) The covariance between stock returns at time t and
21Note that in a model with smart-money investors, sketched at the end of Section 2, λ would naturally be small:
since these investors invest their own wealth, their hedging demand would be inﬂuenced only by the bird-in-the-hand
eﬀect.








where (χ1,χ2) are constants. For small s, the term in the square bracket of (4.11) is positive if
t′ − t < ˆ u and negative if t′ − t > ˆ u, for a threshold ˆ u which is positive if λ < λR and zero if
λ > λR. A stock’s return predicts positively the stock’s subsequent return for t′ − t < ˆ u (short-run
momentum) and negatively for t′ − t > ˆ u (long-run reversal). It predicts in the same manner the
subsequent return of another stock when the covariance between each stock in the pair and the ﬂow
portfolio has the same sign, and in the opposite manner otherwise.
When λ is small, stocks exhibit positive autocovariance for short lags and negative for long
lags, i.e., short-run momentum and long-run reversal. This is because expected returns vary over
time only in response to changes in Ct and the changes in yt that these trigger. Moreover, changes
in Ct move prices and short-run expected returns in the same direction, but long-run expected
returns in the opposite direction. When instead λ is large, autocovariance is negative for all lags
because changes in Ct move even short-run expected returns in the opposite direction to prices.22
Lead-lag eﬀects have the same sign as autocovariance for stock pairs whose covariance with the
ﬂow portfolio has the same sign. This is because changes in Ct inﬂuence both stocks in the same
manner.
5 Asymmetric Information
This section treats the case of asymmetric information, where the investor does not observe the
cost Ct and seeks to infer it from the returns and share prices of the index and active funds. Asym-
metric information involves the additional complexity of having to solve for the investor’s dynamic
inference problem. Yet, this complexity does not come at the expense of tractability: the equilib-
rium has a similar formal structure and many properties in common with symmetric information.
For example, the autocovariance and non-fundamental covariance matrices are identical to their
symmetric-information counterparts up to multiplicative scalars.
We maintain the adjustment cost assumed in Section 4, and look for an equilibrium with the
following characteristics. The investor’s conditional distribution of Ct is normal with mean ˆ Ct. The
22The result that stocks exhibit short-run momentum and long-run reversal when λ is small, but reversal for all
lags when λ is large is consistent with the implication of Corollary 3.7 that an increase in λ increases the extent of
reversal.
26variance of the conditional distribution is, in general, a deterministic function of time, but we focus





Ft − ¯ F
r + κ
− (a0 + a1 ˆ Ct + a2Ct + a3yt), (5.1)
where (a0,a1,a2,a3) are constant vectors. The conditional mean ˆ Ct becomes a state variable and
aﬀects prices because it determines the investor’s target holdings of the active fund. The true
value Ct, which is observed by the manager, also aﬀects prices because it forecasts the investor’s
target holdings in the future. We conjecture that the eﬀects of ( ˆ Ct,Ct,yt) on prices depend on the
covariance with the ﬂow portfolio, as is the case for (Ct,yt) under symmetric information. That is,
there exist constants (γ1,γ2,γ3) such that for i = 1,2,3,
ai = γiΣp′
f. (5.2)
The investor’s speed of adjustment vt ≡ dyt/dt in our conjectured equilibrium is
vt = b0 − b1 ˆ Ct − b2yt, (5.3)
where (b0,b1,b2) are constants. Eq. (5.3) is identical to its symmetric-information counterpart
(4.2), except that Ct is replaced by its mean ˆ Ct. We refer to an equilibrium satisfying (5.1)-(5.3)
as linear.
5.1 Investor’s Inference
The investor seeks to infer the cost Ct from fund returns and share prices. The share prices of
the index and active fund are ztSt and 1St, respectively, and are informative about Ct because Ct
aﬀects the vector of stock prices St. Prices do not reveal Ct perfectly, however, because they also
depend on the time-varying expected dividend Ft that the investor does not observe.
In addition to prices, the investor observes the net-of-cost return of the active fund, ztdRt−Ctdt,
and the return of the index fund, 1dRt. Because the investor observes prices, she also observes
capital gains, and therefore can deduce net dividends (i.e., dividends minus Ct). Net dividends are
the incremental information that returns provide to the investor.
In equilibrium, the active fund’s portfolio zt is equal to θ − xt1. Since the investor knows xt,
observing the price and net dividends of the index and active funds is informationally equivalent
23The steady state is reached in the limit when time t becomes large.
27to observing the price and net dividends of the index fund and of a hypothetical fund holding
the residual-supply portfolio θ. Therefore, we can take the investor’s information to be the net
dividends of the residual-supply portfolio θdDt − Ctdt, the dividends of the index fund 1dDt, the
price of the residual-supply portfolio θSt, and the price of the index fund 1St.24 We solve the
investor’s inference problem using recursive (Kalman) ﬁltering.
Proposition 5.1 The mean ˆ Ct of the investor’s conditional distribution of Ct evolves according to
the process
d ˆ Ct =κ( ¯ C − ˆ Ct)dt − β1
 

























and T denotes the distribution’s steady-state variance. The variance T is the unique positive solution
of the quadratic equation
T2
 














The term in β1 in (5.4) represents the investor’s learning from net dividends. Recalling the
deﬁnition (3.16) of the ﬂow portfolio, we can write this term as
−β1
 
θdDt − Ctdt − Et (θdDt − Ctdt) −
1Σθ′
1Σ1′ [1dDt − Et(1dDt)]
 
. (5.8)
The investor lowers her estimate of the cost Ct if the net dividends of the residual-supply portfolio
θdDt − Ctdt are above expectations. Of course, net dividends can be high not only because Ct is
24We are assuming that the investor’s information is the same in and out of equilibrium, i.e., the manager cannot
manipulate the investor’s beliefs by deviating from his equilibrium strategy and choosing a portfolio zt  = θ − xt1.
This is consistent with the assumption of a competitive manager. Indeed, one interpretation of this assumption is
that there exists a continuum of managers, each with the same Ct. A deviation by one manager would then not aﬀect
the investors’ beliefs about Ct because these would depend on averages across managers.
28low, but also because gross dividends are high. The investor adjusts for this by comparing with the
dividends 1Dt of the index fund. The adjustment is made by computing the regression residual of
θdDt − Ctdt on 1Dt, which is the term in curly brackets in (5.8).
The term in β2 in (5.4) represents the investor’s learning from prices. The investor lowers her
estimate of Ct if the price of the residual-supply portfolio is above expectations. Indeed, the price
can be high because the manager knows privately that Ct is low, and anticipates that the investor
will increase her participation in the fund, causing the price to rise, as she learns about Ct. As with
dividends, the investor needs to account for the fact that the price of the residual-supply portfolio
can be high not only because Ct is low, but also because the manager expects future dividends to
be high (Ft small). She adjusts for this by comparing with the price of the index fund. Note that
if the expected dividend Ft is constant (φ = 0), learning from prices is perfect: (5.7) implies that
the conditional variance T is zero.
Because the investor compares the performance of the residual-supply portfolio, and hence of
the active fund, to that of the index fund, she is eﬀectively using the index as a benchmark. Note
that benchmarking is not part of an explicit contract tying the manager’s compensation to the
index. Compensation is tied to the index only implicitly: if the active fund outperforms the index,
the investor infers that Ct is low and increases her participation in the fund.
5.2 Optimization
The manager chooses controls (¯ ct, ¯ yt,zt) to maximize the expected utility (2.2) subject to the budget
constraint (3.3), the normalization (3.6), and the investor’s holding policy (5.3). Since stock prices
depend on ( ˆ Ct,Ct,yt), the same is true for the manager’s value function. We conjecture that the
value function is








t ¯ Q ¯ Xt
  
, (5.9)
where ¯ Xt ≡ ( ˆ Ct,Ct,yt)′, (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ q3) are constants, and ¯ Q is a constant symmetric 3 × 3 matrix.
Proposition 5.2 The value function (5.9) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (3.8) if (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ q3, ¯ Q)
satisfy a system of ten scalar equations.
29The investor chooses controls (ct,xt,vt) to maximize the expected utility (2.1) subject to the
budget constraint (4.4) and the manager’s portfolio policy zt = θ−xt1. As in the case of symmetric
information, we study this optimization problem in two steps: ﬁrst optimize over (ct,xt), assuming
that vt is given by (5.3), and then derive conditions under which (5.3) is optimal. We solve the ﬁrst
problem using dynamic programming, and conjecture the value function (4.5), where Xt ≡ ( ˆ Ct,yt)′,
(q0,q1,q2) are constants, and Q is a constant symmetric 2 × 2 matrix.
Proposition 5.3 The value function (4.5) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (4.6) if (q0,q1,q2,Q)
satisfy a system of six scalar equations. The control vt given by (5.3) is optimal if (b0,b1,b2) satisfy
a system of three scalar equations.
5.3 Equilibrium
Proposition 5.4 shows that a unique linear equilibrium exists when the diﬀusion coeﬃcient s of Ct is
small. Our numerical solutions for general values of s seem to generate a unique linear equilibrium,
with properties similar to those derived in the rest of this section for small s.25
Proposition 5.4 For small s, there exists a unique linear equilibrium. The constants (b1,b2,γ1)
are positive, and the constant γ3 is negative. The constant γ2 is positive if λ ≥ 0.
When information is asymmetric, cashﬂow news aﬀect the investor’s estimate of the cost Ct,
and so trigger fund ﬂows. These ﬂows, in turn, impact stock returns. We refer to the eﬀect that
cashﬂow news have on returns through fund ﬂows as an indirect eﬀect, to distinguish from the direct
eﬀect computed by holding ﬂows constant. To illustrate the two eﬀects, consider the dividend shock
dDt at time t. The shock’s direct eﬀect is to add dDt to returns dRt = dDt + dSt − rStdt. The
shock’s indirect eﬀect is to trigger fund ﬂows which impact returns dRt through the price change
dSt. Eqs. (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4) imply that the indirect eﬀect is β1γ1Σp′
fpfdDt.
The indirect eﬀect ampliﬁes the direct eﬀect. Suppose, for example, that a stock experiences
a negative cashﬂow shock. If the stock is in large residual supply, and so overweighed by the
active fund, then the shock lowers the return of the active fund more than of the index fund. As
a consequence, the investor infers that Ct has increased, and ﬂows out of the active and into the
index fund. Since the active fund overweighs the stock, the investor’s ﬂows cause the stock to be
25This applies to b1 > 0, b2 > 0, γ1 > 0, γ2 > 0, γ3 < 0, and to Corollaries 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
30sold and push its price down. Conversely, if the stock is in small residual supply, then the investor
infers that Ct has decreased, and ﬂows out of the index and into the active fund. Since the active
fund underweighs the stock, the investor’s ﬂows cause again the stock to be sold and push its price
down. Thus, in both cases, fund ﬂows amplify the direct eﬀect that the cashﬂow shock has on
returns.
Ampliﬁcation is related to comovement. Recall that under symmetric information fund ﬂows
generate comovement between a pair of stocks because they aﬀect the expected return of each
stock in the pair. This channel of comovement, to which we refer as ER/ER (where ER stands for
expected return) is also present under asymmetric information. Asymmetric information introduces
an additional channel involving fund ﬂows, to which we refer as CF/ER (where CF stands for
cashﬂow). This is that cashﬂow news of one stock in a pair trigger fund ﬂows which aﬀect the
expected return of the other stock. The CF/ER channel is the one related to ampliﬁcation.
While the ER/ER and CF/ER channels are conceptually distinct, their eﬀects are formally
similar: the covariance matrix generated by CF/ER is equal to that generated by ER/ER times a
positive scalar (Corollary 5.1). Thus, if ER/ER generates a positive covariance between a pair of
stocks, so does CF/ER, and if the former covariance is large, so is the latter. Consider, for example,
two stocks that are in large residual supply. Since outﬂows from the active fund (triggered by, e.g.,
a cashﬂow shock to a third stock) push down the prices of both stocks, ER/ER generates a positive
covariance. Moreover, since a negative cashﬂow shock to one stock triggers outﬂows from the active
fund and this pushes down the price of the other stock, CF/ER also generates a positive covariance.
The former covariance is large if the two stocks have high idiosyncratic risk since this makes them
more sensitive to fund ﬂows. But high idiosyncratic risk also renders the latter covariance large:
cashﬂow shocks to stocks having low correlation with the index generate a large discrepancy between
the active and the index return, hence triggering large fund ﬂows.
Corollary 5.1 computes the covariance matrix of stock returns. The fundamental covariance
is identical to that under symmetric information, while the non-fundamental covariance is propor-
tional. The intuition for proportionality is that the covariance matrices generated by ER/ER and
CF/ER are proportional, the non-fundamental covariance under symmetric information is gener-
ated by ER/ER, and that under asymmetric information is generated by ER/ER and CF/ER.
Corollary 5.1 shows, in addition, that for small s the non-fundamental covariance matrix is larger
under asymmetric information, i.e., the proportionality coeﬃcient with the symmetric-information
matrix is larger than one. This result, which our numerical solutions suggest is general, implies
31that the non-fundamental volatility of each stock is larger under asymmetric information, and so is
the absolute value of the non-fundamental covariance between any pair of stocks. Intuitively, these
quantities are larger under asymmetric information because the ampliﬁcation channel CF/ER is
present only in that case.








where k is a positive constant. The fundamental covariance is identical to that under symmetric
information, while the non-fundamental covariance is proportional. Moreover, for small s, the
proportionality coeﬃcient is larger than one.
The cross section of expected returns is explained by the same two factors as under symmetric
information.
Corollary 5.2 (Expected Returns) Stocks’ expected returns are given by the two-factor model
(3.21), with the factors being the market and the ﬂow portfolio. The factor risk premium Λt
associated to the ﬂow portfolio is
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3 ,k1,k2) are constants. For small s, the constants (γR
1 ,γR
3 ) are negative and the
constant γR
2 has the same sign as λ.
Using Corollary 5.2, we can examine how expected returns respond to shocks. Consider a
cashﬂow shock, which we assume is negative and hits a stock in large residual supply. The shock
raises ˆ Ct, the investor’s estimate of Ct. The increase in ˆ Ct lowers the prices of stocks covarying
positively with the ﬂow portfolio (including the stock hit by the cashﬂow shock) since γ1 > 0, and
lowers the subsequent expected returns of these stocks since γR
1 < 0. The simultaneous decrease
in prices and expected returns is consistent because expected returns increase in the long run.
Expected returns decrease in the short run because of the bird-in-the-hand eﬀect.
The time-variation in expected returns following cashﬂow shocks can be characterized in terms
of the covariance between cashﬂow shocks and subsequent returns. Corollary 5.3 computes the
32covariance between the vectors (dDt,dFt) of cashﬂow shocks at time t and the vector of returns at
time t′ > t. Both covariance matrices are equal to the non-fundamental covariance matrix times a
scalar which is positive for short lags and negative for long lags. Thus, cashﬂow shocks generate
short-run momentum and long-run reversal in returns, consistent with the discussion in the previous
paragraph. Note that predictability based on cashﬂows arises only under asymmetric information
because only then cashﬂow shocks trigger fund ﬂows.
Corollary 5.3 (Return Predictability Based on Cashﬂows) The covariance between cash-
















2 ) are constants. For small s, the term in the square bracket of (4.11) is positive if
t′ − t < ˆ uD and negative if t′ − t > ˆ uD, for a threshold ˆ uD > 0. A stock’s cashﬂow shocks predict
positively the stock’s subsequent return for t′ − t < ˆ uD (short-run momentum) and negatively for
t′ −t > ˆ uD (long-run reversal). They predict in the same manner the subsequent return of another
stock when the covariance between each stock in the pair and the ﬂow portfolio has the same sign,
and in the opposite manner otherwise.
We ﬁnally examine predictability based on past returns rather than cashﬂows. This predictabil-
ity is driven both by cashﬂow shocks and by shocks to Ct. Predictability based on past returns has
the same form as under symmetric information (Corollary 4.2), except that short-run momentum
arises even for large λ.26
Corollary 5.4 (Return Predictability) The covariance between stock returns at time t and








26The latter result relies on the assumption that s is small. Recall that when information is symmetric, short-
run momentum does not arise for large λ because of commercial risk. Indeed, an increase in Ct lowers the prices
of stocks covarying positively with the ﬂow portfolio because of the anticipation of future outﬂows from the active
fund. Moreover, the subsequent expected returns of these shocks increase, even in the short run, because the manager
becomes more concerned with commercial risk (and this eﬀect dominates the bird-in-the-hand eﬀect for large λ). Both
eﬀects are also present when information is asymmetric. Under asymmetric information, however, predictability is
driven not only by shocks to Ct but also by cashﬂow shocks. Moreover, the latter have a dominating eﬀect when
shocks to Ct have small variance (small s). Indeed, for small s, shocks to Ct are not only small but also trigger a
small price reaction holding size constant. This is because the price reaction is driven by the anticipation of future
ﬂows as the investor learns about Ct, and learning is limited for small s.
33where (χ1,χ2,χ3,ρ) are constants. For λ ≥ 0 and small s, the term in the square bracket of (5.13)
is positive if t′ − t < ˆ u and negative if t′ − t > ˆ u, for a threshold ˆ u > 0. Given ˆ u, predictability is
as in Corollary 4.2.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio
management. Momentum arises because prices do not fully adjust to reﬂect future fund ﬂows, and
reversal arises because these ﬂows push prices away from fundamental values. Besides momentum
and reversal, fund ﬂows generate comovement, lead-lag eﬀects and ampliﬁcation, with all eﬀects
being larger for assets with high idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, managers’ concern with commercial
risk makes prices more volatile. Our model provides a parsimonious and tractable framework to
study the price eﬀects of fund ﬂows.
In focusing on ﬂows between investment funds as a driver of momentum, we do not intend to
suggest that they are the only driver. Indeed, momentum could be also generated by gradual and
anticipated changes in leverage or irrational sentiment. At the same time, ﬂows between investment
funds seem to be a relevant driver of momentum as recent empirical ﬁndings indicate, and can be
modeled in a manner that might be more tractable than alternatives. Moreover, the basic intuitions
identiﬁed in this paper, e.g., momentum is driven by the bird-in-the-hand eﬀect and is possible only
because of the subsequent reversal, seem general and could carry over to other settings.
Our emphasis in this paper is to develop a framework that allows for a general analysis of
the price eﬀects of fund ﬂows. An important next step, left for future work, is to examine more
systematically the empirical implications of our analysis, both to confront existing empirical facts
and to suggest new tests. For example, is momentum larger for individual assets or asset classes?




Proof of Proposition 3.1: Eqs. (2.3), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) imply that
d
 





















¯ G ≡r¯ α
 
rWt + ˆ zt
 
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1 ¯ C
 
+ (λCt + B)(b0 − b1Ct) − ¯ ct
 




¯ f1(Ct) ≡ ¯ q1 + ¯ q11Ct.
Eqs. (3.7) and (A.1) imply that














Substituting (A.2) into (3.8), we can write the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ¯ ct and ˆ zt as
¯ αexp(−¯ α¯ ct) + r¯ α¯ V = 0, (A.3)




¯ h(Ct) ≡ ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1 ¯ C + s2a1 ¯ f1(Ct). (A.5)





(r¯ α)2ˆ zt(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)ˆ z′
t + r¯ αs2ˆ zta1 ¯ f1(Ct) −
1
2
s2 ¯ f1(Ct)2 + ¯ β − r = 0. (A.6)
Eqs. (3.7) and (A.3) imply that











35Substituting (A.7) into (A.6) the terms in Wt cancel, and we are left with
r¯ αˆ zt
 
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1 ¯ C
 
+ r¯ α(λCt + B)(b0 − b1Ct) − r
 






+ ¯ f1(Ct)κ( ¯ C − Ct) +
1
2




(r¯ α)2ˆ zt(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)ˆ z′
t + r¯ αs2ˆ zta1 ¯ f1(Ct) −
1
2
s2 ¯ f1(Ct)2 = 0. (A.8)
The terms in (A.8) that involve ˆ zt can be written as
r¯ αˆ zt
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= r¯ αˆ zt¯ h(Ct) −
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¯ h(Ct)′(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)−1¯ h(Ct), (A.9)




¯ h(Ct)′(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)−1¯ h(Ct) + r¯ α(λCt + B)(b0 − b1Ct) − r
 










¯ q11 − ¯ f1(Ct)2 
+ ¯ β − r + rlog(r) = 0. (A.10)
Eq. (A.10) is quadratic in Ct. Identifying terms in C2
t , Ct, and constants, yields three scalar
equations in (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q11). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition
3.3 (see (A.40) and (A.41)).
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Eqs. (2.3), (3.4) and (3.10) imply that
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36f1(Ct) ≡ q1 + q11Ct.






(rα)2f(xt1 + ytzt)Σ(xt1 + ytzt)′ −
1
2




Substituting (A.12) into (3.12), we can write the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ct, xt and yt
as
αexp(−αct) + rαV = 0, (A.13)
1h(Ct) = rα1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)(xt1 + ytzt)′, (A.14)
zth(Ct) − Ct = rαzt(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)(xt1 + ytzt)′, (A.15)
respectively, where
h(Ct) ≡ ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1 ¯ C + s2a1f1(Ct). (A.16)
Eqs. (A.14) and (A.15) are equivalent to (3.13) and (3.14) because of (2.3), (3.4) and (3.5). Solving
for ct, and proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we can simplify (3.12) to
rα(xt1 + ytzt)
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− rαytCt − r
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Eq. (A.17) is the counterpart of (A.8) for the investor. The terms in (A.17) that involve (xt,yt)
can be written as
rα(xt1 + ytzt)
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1)(xt1 + ytzt)′ + rαs2(xt1 + ytzt)a1f1(Ct)
= rα(xt1 + ytzt)h(Ct) − rαytCt −
1
2









where the ﬁrst step follows from (A.16) and the second from
(xt1 + ytzt)h(Ct) − ytCt = rα(xt1 + ytzt)(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)(xt1 + ytzt)′, (A.19)
37which in turn follows by multiplying (A.14) by xt, (A.15) by yt, and adding up. To eliminate xt
and yt in (A.18), we use (A.14) and (A.15). Noting that in equilibrium zt = θ − xt1, we can write
(A.14) as
1h(Ct) = rα1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)[xt(1 − yt)1 + ytθ]
′ . (A.20)
Multiplying (A.14) by xt and adding to (A.15), we similarly ﬁnd
θh(Ct) − Ct = rαθ(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)[xt(1 − yt)1 + ytθ]
′ . (A.21)
Eqs. (A.20) and (A.21) form a linear system in xt(1 − yt) and yt. Solving the system, we ﬁnd












[θh(Ct) − Ct]1(fΣ + s2a1a′






























2 θ(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)θ′ − 2[θh(Ct) − Ct]1h(Ct)1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)θ′
+[θh(Ct) − Ct]









2 θ(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)θ′ − 2[θh(Ct) − Ct]1h(Ct)1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)θ′
+[θh(Ct) − Ct]















q11 − f1(Ct)2 
+ β − r + rlog(r) = 0. (A.25)
38Eq. (A.25) is quadratic in Ct. Identifying terms in C2
t , Ct, and constants, yields three scalar
equations in (q0,q1,q11). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition
3.3 (see (A.44) and (A.45)).
Proof of Proposition 3.3: We ﬁrst impose market clearing and derive the constants (a0,a1,b0,b1)
as functions of (¯ q1, ¯ q11,q1,q11). For these derivations, as well as for later proofs, we use the following








Setting zt = θ − xt1 and ¯ yt = 1 − yt, we can write (A.4) as
¯ h(Ct) = r¯ α(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)(1 − yt)(θ − xt1)′. (A.26)









= 1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)θ′. (A.27)
Eq. (A.27) is linear in Ct. Identifying terms in Ct, we ﬁnd
 
r + κ + s2q11
rα
+
r + κ + s2¯ q11
r¯ α
 
1a1 = 0 ⇒ 1a1 = 0. (A.28)
Identifying constant terms, and using (A.28), we ﬁnd
1a0 =
α¯ αf
α + ¯ α
1Σθ′. (A.29)
Substituting (A.28) and (A.29) into (A.20), we ﬁnd
rα¯ αf
α + ¯ α
1Σθ′ = rαf1Σ[xt(1 − yt)1 + ytθ]
′ ⇒ xt =
¯ α




Substituting (A.30) into (A.26), we ﬁnd




α + ¯ α
1Σθ′
1Σ1′1 + (1 − yt)pf
 ′




α + ¯ α
1Σθ′
1Σ1′1 + (1 − b0 + b1Ct)pf
 ′
, (A.31)
39where the second step follows from (3.2). Eq. (A.31) is linear in Ct. Identifying terms in Ct, we
ﬁnd








Therefore, a1 is collinear to the vector Σp′
f, as in (3.15). Substituting (3.15) into (A.32), we ﬁnd








Identifying constant terms in (A.31), and using (3.15), we ﬁnd
a0 =
α¯ αf




γ1(κ ¯ C − s2¯ q1)
r









Using (3.2) and (A.30), we can write (A.21) as




α + ¯ α
1Σθ′




α + ¯ α
(1Σθ′)2









where the second step follows from (3.15). Eq. (A.35) is linear in Ct. Identifying terms in Ct, and
using (3.15), we ﬁnd
(r + κ + s2q11)
γ1∆









Identifying constant terms, and using (3.15) and (A.34), we ﬁnd
b0 =
¯ α
α + ¯ α
+
s2γ1(q1 − ¯ q1)








Substituting b0 from (A.37) into (A.34), we ﬁnd
a0 =
α¯ αf







s2γ1(α¯ q1 + ¯ αq1)













The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables are
(a0,a1,b0,b1,γ1, ¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q11,q0,q1,q11). The equations linking them are (3.15), (A.33), (A.36), (A.37),
40(A.38), the three equations derived from (A.10) by identifying terms in C2
t , Ct, and constants, and
the three equations derived from (A.25) through the same procedure. To simplify the system,
we note that the variables (¯ q0,q0) enter only in the equations derived from (A.10) and (A.25) by
identifying constants. Therefore they can be determined separately, and we need to consider only
the equations derived from (A.10) and (A.25) by identifying linear and quadratic terms. We next
simplify these equations, using implications of market clearing.
Using (A.31), we ﬁnd
1
2




2(α + ¯ α)21Σ1′ +
1
2

















α + ¯ α
+
s2γ1(¯ q1 − q1)



















where the second step follows from (A.37). Substituting (A.39) into (A.10), and identifying terms
in C2
t and Ct, we ﬁnd
(r + 2κ)¯ q11 + s2¯ q2









1Σ1′ + r¯ αλb1 = 0, (A.40)










α + ¯ α
+
¯ αs2γ1(¯ q1 − q1)
α + ¯ α

 ∆
1Σ1′ − κ ¯ C¯ q11 + r¯ α(Bb1 − λb0) = 0,
(A.41)
respectively. Using (3.15) and (A.30), we can write (A.20) as
1h(Ct) =
rα¯ αf
α + ¯ α
1Σθ′. (A.42)









Using (3.15), (A.35), (A.37), (A.42) and (A.43), we ﬁnd that the equations derived from (A.25) by
41identifying terms in C2
t and Ct are










1Σ1′ = 0, (A.44)










α + ¯ α
+
αs2γ1(q1 − ¯ q1)
α + ¯ α

 ∆
1Σ1′ − κ ¯ Cq11 = 0, (A.45)
respectively.
Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (3.15), (A.33), (A.36), (A.37), (A.38),
(A.40), (A.41), (A.44) and (A.45) in the unknowns (a0,a1,b0,b1,γ1, ¯ q1, ¯ q11,q1,q11). This reduces
to solving the system of (A.33), (A.36), (A.40) and (A.44) in the unknowns (b1,γ1, ¯ q11,q11): given
(b1,γ1, ¯ q11,q11), a1 can be determined from (3.15), (¯ q1,q1) from the linear system of (A.41) and
(A.45), and (a0,b0) from (A.38) and (A.37). Replacing the unknown b1 by






we can write the system of (A.33), (A.36), (A.40) and (A.44) as





































¯ α21Σ1′ = 0. (A.49)
To show that the system of (A.46)-(A.49) has a solution, we reduce it to a single equation in ˆ b1.
Eq. (A.49) is quadratic in q11 and has a unique positive solution q11(ˆ b1), which is increasing in
ˆ b1 ∈ (0,∞), and is equal to zero for ˆ b1 = 0 and to ∞ for ˆ b1 = ∞.27 Substituting q11(ˆ b1) into
(A.47), we ﬁnd
















27The positive solution of (A.49) is the relevant one. Indeed, under the negative solution, the investor’s certainty
equivalent would converge to −∞ when |Ct| goes to ∞. The investor can, however, achieve a certainty equivalent
converging to ∞ by holding a large short position in the active fund when Ct goes to ∞, or a large long position
when Ct goes to −∞.
42The left-hand side of (A.50) is increasing in γ1 ∈ (0,∞), and is equal to ˆ b1
√
f∆/(r¯ α1Σ1′) for
γ1 = 0 and to ∞ for γ1 = ∞. Therefore, (A.50) has a unique positive solution γ1(ˆ b1) if ˆ b1 ∈ (0,ˆ b∗
1),
where ˆ b∗
1 ≡ ¯ α1Σ1′/(α
√
f∆), and no solution if ˆ b1 ∈ (ˆ b∗
1,∞). The solution is decreasing in ˆ b1 since
the left-hand side of (A.50) is increasing in ˆ b1, and is equal to 1Σ1′/[(r + κ)∆] for ˆ b1 = 0 and to
zero for ˆ b1 = ˆ b∗





















Eq. (A.51) is the single equation in ˆ b1 to which the system of (A.46)-(A.49) reduces. Since the
left-hand side of (A.51) is equal to −(r + κ)κ/s2 for ˆ b1 = 0 and to ∞ for ˆ b1 = ˆ b∗
1, (A.51) has a
solution ˆ b1 ∈ (0,ˆ b∗
1). Therefore, a linear equilibrium exists. The equilibrium is unique if the solution
ˆ b1 of (A.51) is unique, which is the case if the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to ˆ b1






















































































































The term inside the ﬁrst squared bracket is positive. The term inside the second squared bracket is
negative for λ = 0 and by continuity for λ < ¯ λ for a ¯ λ > 0. Since γ1(ˆ b1) is decreasing in ˆ b1, (A.53)
is positive for λ < ¯ λ.
43Proof of Corollary 3.1: Eq. yt = ¯ α(α + ¯ α) follows from (3.2) and (A.37). Eq. xt = 0 follows
from (A.30) and yt = ¯ α(α + ¯ α). The ﬁrst equality in (3.17) follows from (3.4) and (A.38), and the
second equality follows from (3.5).
Proof of Corollary 3.2: The investor’s eﬀective stock holdings are
xt1 + ytzt = x11 + yt(θ − xt1)
= ytpf +
¯ α
α + ¯ α
1Σθ′
1Σ1′, (A.54)
where the second step follows from (A.30). Eq. (3.18) follows from (3.2) and (A.54).
Proof of Corollary 3.3: The ﬁrst equality in (3.19) follows from (3.1) and (3.15). The second
equality follows from (3.5) and (3.15). To derive the third equality, we note from (3.5) and (3.15)
that
Covt(1dRt,pfdRt) = 0.
Therefore, if β denotes the regression coeﬃcient of dRt on 1dRt, then
Covt(dRt,pfdRt) = Covt (dRt − β1dRt,pfdRt)
= Covt (dǫt,pfdRt)
= Covt [dǫt,pf(dRt − β1dRt)]
= Covt (dǫt,pfdǫt),
where the second and fourth steps follow from the deﬁnition of dǫt, and the third step follows
because dǫt is independent of 1dRt.
Proof of Corollary 3.4: The corollary follows by substituting (3.15) into (3.5).
Proof of Corollary 3.5: Stocks’ expected returns are
Et(dRt) =
 












(r + κ)γ1Ct −
s2γ1(α¯ q1 + ¯ αq1)




















α + ¯ α
1Σθ′
1Σ1′(fΣ + s2a1a′





where the ﬁrst step follows from (3.4), the second from (3.15) and (A.38), and the third from (3.15)
and (3.22). Eq. (A.55) is equivalent to (3.21) because of (3.5).












































t ,(r + κ)a′
1Ct′dt
 








where the ﬁrst step follows by using (3.4) and omitting quantities known at time t, the second step
follows because the increments (dBD
t′ ,dBF
t′ ,dBC
t′ ) are independent of information up to time t′, the
third step follows because BC
t is independent of (BD
t ,BF
t ), and the fourth step follows from (3.15).
Eq. (2.3) implies that









Substituting (A.57) into (A.56), and noting that the only non-zero covariance is between dBC
t and
dBC
t , we ﬁnd (3.23).
Proof of Corollary 3.7: The left-hand side of (A.48) is increasing in λ. Since, in addition, the
derivative (A.53) is positive, the solution ˆ b1 of (A.48) is decreasing in λ. Since γ1(ˆ b1) is decreasing
in ˆ b1, it is increasing in λ.
Since B does not enter into the system of (A.46)-(A.49), it does not aﬀect (b1,γ1, ¯ q11,q11).
Therefore, its eﬀect on Λt is only through (¯ q1,q1). Diﬀerentiating (A.41) and (A.45) with respect
to B, we ﬁnd











α + ¯ α
∆
1Σ1′ + r¯ αb1 = 0, (A.58)











α + ¯ α
∆
1Σ1′ = 0. (A.59)












Y ≡ rα¯ αb1
 





Z ≡ (r + κ + s2¯ q11)(r + κ + s2q11) +
rα2s2b1γ1∆(r + κ + s2¯ q11)
(α + ¯ α)1Σ1′ −
r¯ α2s2b1γ1∆(r + κ + s2q11)







(α + ¯ α)1Σ1′
 









(α + ¯ α)1Σ1′ ,
and where the second equation for Z follows from (A.33). Since (b1,γ1,q11) are positive, so are
(Y,Z). Therefore, α¯ q1 + ¯ αq1 is decreasing in B, and (3.22) implies that Λt is increasing in B.
B Gradual Adjustment





1 Ct + aR














1 ≡ (r + κ)a1 + b1a2,
aR
2 ≡ (r + b2)a2.
Eqs. (2.3), (3.3), (4.2), (4.3) and (B.1) imply the following counterpart of (A.2):















¯ G ≡r¯ α
 
rWt + ˆ zt
 
ra0 + aR
1 Ct + aR
2 yt − κa1 ¯ C − b0a2
 
+ (λCt + B)yt − ¯ ct
 




¯ f1( ¯ Xt) ≡ ¯ q1 + ¯ q11Ct + ¯ q12yt,
¯ f2( ¯ Xt) ≡ ¯ q2 + ¯ q12Ct + ¯ q22yt,
46and ¯ qij denotes the (i,j)’th element of ¯ Q. Substituting (B.2) into (3.8), we can write the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to ¯ ct and ˆ zt as (A.3) and




¯ h( ¯ Xt) ≡ ra0 + aR
1 Ct + aR
2 yt − κa1 ¯ C − b0a2 + s2a1 ¯ f( ¯ Xt). (B.4)
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we ﬁnd the following counterpart of (A.10):
1
2
¯ h( ¯ Xt)′(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)−1¯ h( ¯ Xt) + r¯ α(λCt + B)yt − r
 




t ¯ Q ¯ Xt
 




¯ q11 − ¯ f1( ¯ Xt)2 
+ ¯ β − r + rlog(r) = 0. (B.5)
Eq. (B.5) is quadratic in ¯ Xt. Identifying quadratic, linear and constant terms yields six scalar
equations in (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ Q). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition
4.3 (see (B.38)-(B.40)).
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Suppose that the investor optimizes over (ct,xt) but follows the control






(rα)2f(xt1 + ytzt)Σ(xt1 + ytzt)′ −
1
2







rWt + (xt1 + ytzt)
 
ra0 + aR
1 Ct + aR












f1(Xt) ≡ q1 + q11Ct + q12yt,
f2(Xt) ≡ q2 + q12Ct + q22yt,
and qij denotes the (i,j)’th element of Q. Substituting (B.6) into (4.6), we can write the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to ct and xt as (A.13) and
1h(Xt) = rα1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)(xt1 + ytzt)′, (B.7)
47respectively, where
h(Xt) ≡ ra0 + aR
1 Ct + aR
2 yt − κa1 ¯ C − b0a2 + s2a1f1(Xt). (B.8)




1 Ct + aR















+ f1(Xt)κ( ¯ C − Ct) + f2(Xt)vt +
1
2




(rα)2(xt1 + ytzt)(fΣ + s2a1a′









1 Ct + aR





(rα)2(xt1 + ytzt)(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)(xt1 + ytzt)′ + rαs2(xt1 + ytzt)a1f1(Xt)
= rα(xt1 + ytzt)h(Xt) −
1
2


















where the ﬁrst step follows from (B.8) and the second from the equilibrium condition zt = θ −xt1.
Using zt = θ − xt1, we can write (B.7) as
1h(Xt) = rα1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)[xt(1 − yt)1 + ytθ]
′ (B.11)
⇒xt(1 − yt) =





































1h(Xt) − rαyt1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)θ′ 2
1(fΣ + s2a1a′

















q11 − f1(Xt)2 
+ β − r + rlog(r) = 0. (B.14)
Since vt in (4.2) is linear in Xt, (B.14) is quadratic in Xt. Identifying quadratic, linear and constant
terms yields six scalar equations in (q0,q1,q2,Q). We defer the derivation of these equations until
the proof of Proposition 4.3 (see (B.42)-(B.44)).
We next study optimization over vt, and derive a ﬁrst-order condition under which the control
(4.2) is optimal. We use a perturbation argument, which consists in assuming that the investor fol-
lows the control (4.2) except for an inﬁnitesimal deviation over an inﬁnitesimal internal.28 Suppose
that the investor adds ωdǫ to the control (4.2) over the interval [t,t+dǫ] and subtracts ωdǫ over the
interval [t+dt−dǫ,t+dt], where the inﬁnitesimal dǫ > 0 is o(dt). The increase in adjustment cost
over the ﬁrst interval is ψvtω(dǫ)2 and over the second interval is −ψvt+dtω(dǫ)2. These changes
reduce the investor’s wealth at time t + dt by
ψvtω(dǫ)2(1 + rdt) − ψvt+dtω(dǫ)2
= ψω(dǫ)2(rvtdt − dvt)
= ψω(dǫ)2(rvtdt + b1dCt + b2dyt)
= ψω(dǫ)2  
(r + b2)vtdt + b1
 




where the second step follows from (4.2) and the third from (2.3). The change in the investor’s
wealth between t and t+dt is derived from (4.4) and (B.1), by subtracting (B.15) and replacing yt
by yt + ω(dǫ)2:
dWt =Gωdt − ψω(dǫ)2b1
 























28The perturbation argument is simpler than the dynamic programming approach, which assumes that the investor
can follow any control vt over the entire history. Indeed, under the dynamic programming approach, the state variable
yt which describes the investor’s holdings in the active fund must be replaced by two state variables: the holdings
out of equilibrium, and the holdings in equilibrium. This is because the latter aﬀect the equilibrium price, which the










1 Ct + aR










− ct − ψω(dǫ)2(r + b2)vt.
The investor’s position in the active fund at t + dt is the same under the deviation as under no
deviation. Therefore, the investor’s expected utility at t + dt is given by the value function (4.5)
with the wealth Wt+dt determined by (B.16). The drift DV corresponding to the change in the
value function between t and t + dt is given by the following counterpart of (B.6):







































f1ω(Xt) ≡ f1(Xt) − rαψω(dǫ)2b1.
The drift is maximum for ω = 0, and this yields the ﬁrst-order condition
zth(Xt) − rαψb1s2(xt1 + ytzt)a1 − Ct = rαzt(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)(xt1 + ytzt)′ + ψhψ(Xt), (B.18)
where
hψ(Xt) ≡ (r + b2)vt + b1κ( ¯ C − Ct) − b1s2f1(Xt).
Using (B.7) and the equilibrium condition zt = θ − xt1, we can write (B.18) as
θh(Xt)−rαψb1s2 [xt(1 − yt)1 + ytθ]a1−Ct = rαθ(fΣ+s2a1a′
1)[xt(1 − yt)1 + ytθ]
′+ψhψ(Xt).
(B.19)





− rαψb1s21h(Xt) − rαyt1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)θ′
rα1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)1′ 1a1 − Ct










50Eq. (B.20) is linear in Xt. Identifying linear and constant terms, yields three scalar equations
in (b0,b1,b2). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 4.3 (see
(B.29)-(B.35)).
Proof of Proposition 4.3: We ﬁrst impose market clearing and follow similar steps as in the proof
of Proposition 3.3 to derive the constants (a0,a1,a2,b0,b1,b2) as functions of (¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ Q,q1,q2,Q).
Setting zt = θ − xt1 and ¯ yt = 1 − yt, we can write (B.3) as
¯ h( ¯ Xt) = r¯ α(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)(1 − yt)(θ − xt1)′. (B.21)






¯ h( ¯ Xt)
r¯ α
 
= 1(fΣ + s2a1a′
1)θ′. (B.22)
Eq. (B.22) is linear in (Ct,yt). Identifying terms in Ct and yt, we ﬁnd
 
r + κ + s2q11
rα
+




b1(α + ¯ α)
rα¯ α









(r + b2)(α + ¯ α)
rα¯ α
1a2 = 0, (B.24)
respectively. Eqs. (B.23) and (B.24) imply
1a1 = 1a2 = 0. (B.25)
Identifying constant terms in (B.22), and using (B.25), we ﬁnd (A.29). Substituting (A.29) and
(B.25) into (B.11), we ﬁnd (A.30).
Substituting (A.30) into (B.21), we ﬁnd




α + ¯ α
1Σθ′
1Σ1′1 + (1 − yt)pf
 ′
. (B.26)
Eq. (A.31) is linear in ¯ Xt. Identifying terms in Ct and yt, we ﬁnd
(r + κ + s2¯ q11)a1 + b1a2 = 0, (B.27)








51respectively. Therefore, (a1,a2) are collinear to the vector Σp′
f, as in (4.7). Substituting (4.7) into
(B.27) and (B.28), we ﬁnd
(r + κ + s2¯ q11)γ1 + b1γ2 = 0, (B.29)








respectively. Identifying constant terms in (B.26), and using (4.7), we ﬁnd
a0 =
α¯ αf

































⇒ θh(Xt) − rαψb1s2γ1
∆
1Σ1′yt − Ct =
rα¯ αf












where the second step follows from (4.7). Eq. (B.32) is linear in (Ct,yt). Identifying terms in Ct
and yt, and using (4.2) and (4.7), we ﬁnd
 
(r + κ + s2q11)γ1 + b1γ2
  ∆
1Σ1′ − 1 = −ψb1(r + κ + b2 + s2q11), (B.33)
 
















respectively. Identifying constant terms, and using (4.2), (4.7) and (B.31), we ﬁnd
 










(r + b2)b0 + b1(κ ¯ C − s2q1)
 
. (B.35)
The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables
are (a0,a1,a2,b0,b1,b2,γ1,γ2, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ Q,q1,q2,Q). (As in Proposition 3.3, we can drop (¯ q0,q0).) The
equations linking them are (4.7), (B.29)-(B.31), (B.33)-(B.35), the ﬁve equations derived from (B.5)
52by identifying linear and quadratic terms, and the ﬁve equations derived from (B.14) through the
same procedure. We next simplify the latter two sets of equations, using implications of market
clearing.
Using (B.26), we ﬁnd
1
2
¯ h( ¯ Xt)′(fΣ+s2a1a′
1)−1¯ h( ¯ Xt) =
r2α2¯ α2f(1Σθ′)2












We next substitute (B.36) into (B.5), and identify terms. Identifying terms in C2







  ¯ Q ¯ R2 ¯ Q + ¯ Q ¯ R1 + ¯ R′
1 ¯ Q − ¯ R0






























Eq. (B.37) must hold for all ¯ Xt. Since the square matrix in (B.37) is symmetric, it must equal zero,
and this yields the algebraic Riccati equation
¯ Q ¯ R2 ¯ Q + ¯ Q ¯ R1 + ¯ R′
1 ¯ Q − ¯ R0 = 0. (B.38)
We next identify terms in Ct and yt, which yield
(r + κ + s2¯ q11)¯ q1 + b1¯ q2 − κ ¯ C¯ q11 − b0¯ q12 = 0, (B.39)








1Σ1′ − r¯ αB − κ ¯ C¯ q12 − b0¯ q22 = 0, (B.40)
respectively. Using (3.15) and (A.30), we can write (B.11) as
1h(Xt) =
rα¯ αf
α + ¯ α
1Σθ′. (B.41)
53Using (4.2), (4.7), (B.32) and (B.41), we ﬁnd that the equation derived from (B.14) by identifying
terms in C2
t , Ctyt and y2
t is
QR2Q + QR1 + R′



















1 −rαψb1(r + κ + 2b2)










1Σ1′ − rαψb2(2r + 3b2)
 
,
and the equations derived by identifying terms in Ct and yt are
(r + κ + s2q11)q1 + b1q2 − rαψb0b1 − κ ¯ Cq11 − b0q12 = 0, (B.43)
(r + b2)q2 + s2(q12 + rαψb1)q1 − rαψ
 
(r + 2b2)b0 + b1κ ¯ C
 
− κ ¯ Cq12 − b0q22 = 0, (B.44)
respectively.
Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (4.7), (B.29)-(B.31), (B.33)-(B.35),
(B.38)-(B.40) and (B.42)-(B.44) in the unknowns (a0,a1,a2,b0,b1,b2,γ1,γ2, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ Q,q1,q2,Q). This
reduces to solving the system of (B.29), (B.30), (B.33), (B.34), (B.38) and (B.42) in the unknowns
(b1,b2,γ1,γ2, ¯ Q,Q): given (b1,b2,γ1,γ2, ¯ Q,Q), (a1,a2) can be determined from (4.7), (b0, ¯ q1, ¯ q2,q1,q2)
from the linear system of (B.35), (B.39), (B.40), (B.43) and (B.44), and a0 from (B.31). We replace
the system of (B.29), (B.30), (B.33), (B.34), (B.38) and (B.42) by the equivalent system of (B.29),
(B.30), (B.38), (B.42),





















54For s = 0, (B.29), (B.30), (B.38), (B.42), (B.45) and (B.46) become
(r + κ)γ1 + b1γ2 = 0, (B.47)
(r + b2)γ2 = −r¯ αf, (B.48)
¯ Q ¯ R0
1 + ¯ R0′
1 ¯ Q − ¯ R0
0 = 0, (B.49)
QR0
1 + R0′
1 Q − R0
0 = 0, (B.50)
ψb1(r + κ + b2) = 1, (B.51)


























1 −rαψb1(r + κ + 2b2)
−rαψb1(r + κ + 2b2) r2α2f ∆
1Σ1′ − rαψb2(2r + 3b2)
 
.
Eq. (B.52) is quadratic and has a unique positive solution b2.29 Given b2, b1 is determined uniquely
from (B.51), γ2 from (B.48), γ1 from (B.47), ¯ Q from (B.49) (which is linear in ¯ Q), and Q from





To show that the system of (B.29), (B.30), (B.38), (B.42), (B.45) and (B.46) has a solution for
small s, we apply the implicit function theorem. We move all terms in each equation to the left-
hand side, and stack all left-hand sides into a vector F, in the order (B.46), (B.45), (B.30), (B.29),
(B.38), (B.42). Treated as a function of (b1,b2,γ1,γ2, ¯ Q,Q,s), F is continuously diﬀerentiable




2, ¯ Q0,Q0,0) and is equal to zero at A. To show that the Jacobian
matrix of F with respect to (b1,b2,γ1,γ2, ¯ Q,Q) has non-zero determinant at A, we note that F has
a triangular structure for s = 0: F1 depends only on b2, F2 only on (b1,b2), F3 only on (b2,γ2),
F4 only on (b1,γ1,γ2), F5 only on (b1,b2, ¯ Q), and F6 only on (b1,b2,Q). Therefore, the Jacobian
matrix of F has non-zero determinant at A if the derivatives of F1 with respect to b2, F2 with
29The positive solution is the relevant one. Indeed, since the negative solution satisﬁes r + 2b2 < 0, (B.49) implies
that ¯ q22 < 0. Therefore, the manager’s certainty equivalent would converge to −∞ at the rate y
2
t when |yt| goes to
∞ and Ct is held constant. The manager can, however, achieve higher certainty equivalent by not investing in the
active fund.
55respect to b1, F3 with respect to γ2, and F4 with respect to γ1 are non-zero, and the Jacobian
matrices of F5 with respect to ¯ Q and F6 with respect to Q have non-zero determinants. These
results follow from (B.47)-(B.52) and the positivity of (b0
1,b0
2). Therefore, the implicit function
theorem applies, and the system of (B.29), (B.30), (B.38), (B.42), (B.45) and (B.46) has a solution




2, ¯ Q0,Q0), which corresponds
to the unique equilibrium for s = 0. Since b0
1 > 0, b0
2 > 0, γ0
1 > 0, γ0
2 < 0, continuity implies that
b1 > 0, b2 > 0, γ1 > 0, γ2 < 0 for small s.




1 Ct + aR











1 Ct + γR
















α + ¯ α
1Σθ′
1Σ1′(fΣ + s2a1a′







1 ≡ (r + κ)γ1 + b1γ2,
γR
2 ≡ (r + b2)γ2.
The ﬁrst step in (B.53) follows from (B.1), the second from (4.7) and (B.31), and the third from
(4.7) and (4.8). Eq. (B.53) is equivalent to (3.21) because of (3.5).
Eq. (B.29) implies that γR
1 has the opposite sign of γ1¯ q11. For small s, γ1 > 0 and ¯ q11 has the
same sign as its value ¯ q0










(r + 2κ)(r + κ + b0
2)
 































56where the last step follows from (B.51). Using (B.52), we ﬁnd
ψ(r + κ + b0
2)(r + 2b0





2 + r(r + κ)
 






r + (r + 2κ)
 
1 +




Eqs. (B.54) and (B.55) imply that ¯ q0
11 is positive if (4.9) holds, and is negative otherwise. Therefore,
for small s, γR
1 is negative if (4.9) holds, and is positive otherwise. Moreover, γR
2 < 0 since b2 > 0
and γ2 < 0.






















where the last step follows from (4.7). Using the dynamics (2.3) and (4.2), we can express (Ct′,yt′)
as a function of their time t values and the Brownian shocks dBC
u for u ∈ [t,t′]. The covariance
(B.56) depends only on how the Brownian shock dBC
t impacts (Ct′,yt′). (See the proof of Corollary
3.6.) To compute this impact, we solve the “impulse-response” dynamics
dCt = −κCtdt,
dyt = −(b1Ct + b2yt)dt,




































57Eqs. (B.58) and (B.59) are used to plot the solid and dashed lines, respectively, in Figure 1.
























The function χ(u) ≡ χ1e−κu+χ2e−b2u can change sign only once, is equal to −s2γ1γR
1 when u = 0,
and has the sign of χ1 if b2 > κ and of χ2 if b2 < κ when u goes to ∞. For small s, γR
1 is negative if
(4.9) holds, and is positive otherwise. The opposite is true for χ(0) since γ1 > 0. Since, in addition,
b1 > 0, b2 > 0 and γ2 < 0, (B.60) and (B.61) imply that χ1 < 0 if b2 > κ and χ2 < 0 if b2 < κ.
Therefore, there exists a threshold ˆ u ≥ 0, which is positive if (4.9) holds and is zero otherwise, such
that χ(u) > 0 for 0 < u < ˆ u and χ(u) < 0 for u > ˆ u.
C Asymmetric Information
Proof of Proposition 5.1: We use Theorem 10.3 of Liptser and Shiryaev (LS 2000). The investor
learns about Ct, which follows the process (2.3). She observes the following information:
• The net dividends of the residual-supply portfolio θDt−Ctdt. This corresponds to the process
ξ1t ≡ θDt −
  t
0 Csds.
• The dividends of the index fund 1dDt. This corresponds to the process ξ2t ≡ 1Dt.
• The price of the residual-supply portfolio θSt. Given the conjecture (5.1) for stock prices,
this is equivalent to observing the process ξ3t ≡ θ(St + a1 ˆ Ct + a3yt).
• The price of the index portfolio 1St. This is equivalent to observing the process ξ4t ≡
1(St + a1 ˆ Ct + a3yt).
58The dynamics of ξ1t are
dξ1t = θ(Ftdt + σdBD
t ) − Ctdt
=
 
(r + κ)θa0 −
κθ ¯ F
r






(r + κ)θa0 −
κθ ¯ F
r










where the ﬁrst step follows from (2.5), the second from (5.1), and the third from (5.2). Likewise,
the dynamics of ξ2t are
dξ2t =
 
(r + κ)1a0 −
κ1 ¯ F
r








  ¯ F
r
+
Ft − ¯ F
r + κ















  ¯ F
r


























where the ﬁrst step follows from (5.1), the second from (2.6) and (2.3), and the fourth from (5.2).












The dynamics (2.3) and (C.1)-(C.4) map into the dynamics (10.62) and (10.63) of LS by setting







, W2t ≡ BC
t , a0(t) ≡ κ ¯ C, a1(t) ≡ −κ, a2(t) ≡ 0,







(r + κ)θa0 − κθ ¯ F
r





































0 0 r + κ 0
0 0 0 r + κ
0 0 −κ 0

































The quantities (b ◦ b)(t), (b ◦ B)(t), and (B ◦ B)(t), deﬁned in LS (10.80) are
(b ◦ b)(t) = s2,












θΣθ′ 1Σθ′ 0 0



















Theorem 10.3 of LS (ﬁrst subequation of (10.81)) implies that




(r + κ)θa0 −
κθ ¯ F
r















(r + κ)1a0 −
κ1 ¯ F
r




























60Eq. (5.4) follows from (C.5) by noting that the term in dt after each dξit, i = 1,2,3,4, is Et(dξit).
In subsequent proofs we use a diﬀerent form of (5.4), where we replace each dξit, i = 1,2,3,4, by
its value in (C.1)-(C.4):























Eq. (5.7) follows from Theorem 10.3 of LS (second subequation of (10.81)).







1 ˆ Ct + γR
2 Ct + γR































1 ≡ (r + κ + ρ)γ1 + b1γ3,
γR
2 ≡ (r + κ)γ2 − ργ1,
γR









Eqs. (2.3), (3.3), (5.3), (C.6) and (C.7) imply that
d
 




t ¯ Q ¯ Xt
 


































β2γ2∆ ¯ f1( ¯ Xt)





¯ G ≡r¯ α
 





1 ˆ Ct + γR
2 Ct + γR





+ (λCt + B)yt − ¯ ct
 
+ ¯ f1( ¯ Xt)
 
κ( ¯ C − ˆ Ct) + ρ(Ct − ˆ Ct)
 






















¯ f1( ¯ Xt) ≡ ¯ q1 + ¯ q11 ˆ Ct + ¯ q12Ct + ¯ q13yt,
¯ f2( ¯ Xt) ≡ ¯ q2 + ¯ q12 ˆ Ct + ¯ q22Ct + ¯ q23yt,
¯ f3( ¯ Xt) ≡ ¯ q3 + ¯ q13 ˆ Ct + ¯ q23Ct + ¯ q33yt.
Eqs. (5.9) and (C.9) imply that



























































β2γ2∆ ¯ f1( ¯ Xt)
1Σ1′ − ¯ f2( ¯ Xt)
 2 
. (C.10)
Substituting (C.10) into (3.8), we can write the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ¯ ct and ˆ zt as
(A.3) and




¯ h( ¯ Xt) ≡ ra0 +
 
γR
1 ˆ Ct + γR
2 Ct + γR


























































62Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we ﬁnd the following counterpart of (A.10):
1
2
¯ h( ¯ Xt)′(fΣ + kΣp′
fpfΣ)−1¯ h( ¯ Xt) + r¯ α(λCt + B)yt − r
 




t ¯ Q ¯ Xt
 
+ ¯ f1( ¯ Xt)
 
κ( ¯ C − ˆ Ct) + ρ(Ct − ˆ Ct)
 






































β2γ2∆ ¯ f1( ¯ Xt)
1Σ1′ + ¯ f2( ¯ Xt)
 2
= 0. (C.16)
Eq. (C.16) is quadratic in ¯ Xt. Identifying quadratic, linear and constant terms yields ten scalar
equations in (¯ q0, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ q3, ¯ Q). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Propo-
sition 5.4 (see (C.40)-(C.43)).
Proof of Proposition 5.3: Dynamics under the investor’s ﬁltration can be deduced from those
under the manager’s by replacing Ct by the investor’s expectation ˆ Ct. Eq. (C.6) implies that the
dynamics of ˆ Ct are













t is a Brownian motion under the investor’s ﬁltration. Eq. (C.7) implies that the net-of-cost
return of the active fund is






2 ) ˆ Ct + gR





































2 ) ˆ Ct + gR






























63Suppose that the investor optimizes over (ct,xt) but follows the control vt given by (5.3). Eqs.
(4.4), (5.3), (C.17), (C.18) and (C.19) imply that
d
 






















































2 ) ˆ Ct + gR




























f1(Xt) ≡ q1 + q11 ˆ Ct + q12yt,
f2(Xt) ≡ q2 + q12 ˆ Ct + q22yt.
Eqs. (4.5) and (C.20) imply that
































































Substituting (C.21) into (4.6), we can write the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ct and xt as
(A.13) and
1h(Xt) = rα1(fΣ + kΣp′
fpfΣ)(xt1 + ytzt)′, (C.22)
respectively, where




2 ) ˆ Ct + gR










































1Σ1′ + β − r + rlog(r) = 0. (C.24)
Since vt in (4.2) is linear in Xt, (C.24) is quadratic in Xt. Identifying quadratic, linear and constant
terms yields six scalar equations in (q0,q1,q2,Q). We defer the derivation of these equations until
the proof of Proposition 5.4 (see (C.44)-(C.46)).
We next study optimization over vt, using the same perturbation argument as in the proof of






− ˆ Ct = rαθ(fΣ + kΣp′
































Eq. (C.26) is linear in Xt. Identifying linear and constant terms, yields three scalar equations
in (b0,b1,b2). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 5.4 (see
(C.36)-(C.38)).
Proof of Proposition 5.4: We ﬁrst impose market clearing and derive the constants (a0,b0,b1,b2,γ1,γ2,γ3)
as functions of (¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ q3, ¯ Q,q1,q2,Q). Setting zt = θ − xt1 and ¯ yt = 1 − yt, we can write (C.11)
and (C.22) as
¯ h( ¯ Xt) = r¯ α(fΣ + kΣp′
fpfΣ)(1 − yt)(θ − xt1)′, (C.27)
1h(Xt) = rα1(fΣ + kΣp′
fpfΣ)[xt(1 − yt)1 + ytθ]
′ , (C.28)







¯ h( ¯ Xt)
r¯ α
 
= 1(fΣ + kΣp′
fpfΣ)θ′. (C.29)
Eq. (C.29) is linear in ( ˆ Ct,Ct,yt). The terms in ˆ Ct, Ct and yt are zero because 1Σp′
f = 0. Identifying
constant terms, we ﬁnd (A.29). Substituting (A.29) into (C.28), we ﬁnd (A.30).
Substituting (A.30) into (C.27), we ﬁnd




α + ¯ α
1Σθ′
1Σ1′1 + (1 − yt)pf
 ′
. (C.30)
Eq. (C.30) is linear in ¯ Xt. Identifying terms in ˆ Ct, Ct and yt, we ﬁnd
(r + κ + ρ)γ1 + b1γ3 + k1¯ q11 + k2¯ q12 = 0, (C.31)
(r + κ)γ2 − ργ1 + k1¯ q12 + k2¯ q22 = 0, (C.32)







respectively. Identifying constant terms, we ﬁnd
a0 =
α¯ αf














Using (A.30), we can write (C.26) as
θh(Xt) − rαψb1k1
∆









⇒ θh(Xt) − rαψb1k1
∆
1Σ1′yt − ˆ Ct =
rα¯ αf











66Eq. (C.35) is linear in ( ˆ Ct,yt). Identifying terms in ˆ Ct and yt, and using (5.3), we ﬁnd

















































respectively. Identifying constant terms, and using (5.3) and (C.34), we ﬁnd
 


























The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables
are (a0,b0,b1,b2,γ1,γ2,γ3,β1,β2,T, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ q3, ¯ Q,q1,q2,Q). (As in Propositions 3.3 and 4.3, we can
drop (¯ q0,q0).) The equations linking them are (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.34), (C.36)-(C.38), the nine
equations derived from (C.16) by identifying linear and quadratic terms, and the ﬁve equations
derived from (C.24) by identifying linear and quadratic terms. We next simplify the latter two sets
of equations, using implications of market clearing.
Using (C.30), we ﬁnd
1
2
¯ h( ¯ Xt)′(fΣ+kΣpfp′
fΣ)−1¯ h( ¯ Xt) =
r2α2¯ α2f(1Σθ′)2











We next substitute (C.39) into (C.16), and identify terms. Quadratic terms yield the algebraic
Riccati equation
¯ Q ¯ R2 ¯ Q + ¯ Q ¯ R1 + ¯ R′































2 + κ + ρ −ρ 0
0 r









0 0 r¯ αλ







Terms in ˆ Ct, Ct and yt yield












1Σ1′ + ¯ q2
  
β2γ2∆¯ q11
1Σ1′ + ¯ q12
 
− κ ¯ C(¯ q11 + ¯ q12) − b0¯ q13 = 0, (C.41)












1Σ1′ + ¯ q2
  
β2γ2∆¯ q12
1Σ1′ + ¯ q22
 
− κ ¯ C(¯ q12 + ¯ q22) − b0¯ q23 = 0, (C.42)












1Σ1′ + ¯ q2
  
β2γ2∆¯ q13









1Σ1′ − r¯ αB − κ ¯ C(¯ q13 + ¯ q23) − b0¯ q33 = 0, (C.43)
respectively. Using (A.30), we can write (C.28) as (B.41). Using (5.3), (B.41) and (C.35), we ﬁnd
that the equation derived from (C.24) by identifying quadratic terms is
QR2Q + QR1 + R′
1Q − R0 = 0, (C.44)
where
R2 ≡









































1 −rαψb1(r + κ + 2b2)






1Σ1′ − rαψb2(2r + 3b2)
 
,
68and the equations derived by identifying terms ˆ Ct and yt are













1Σ1′ − κ ¯ Cq11 − b0q12 − rαψb0b2 = 0,
(C.45)













1Σ1′ − κ ¯ Cq12 − b0q22
− rαψ
 




Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.34), (C.36)-
(C.38), (C.40)-(C.43), (C.44)-(C.46) in the unknowns (a0,b0,b1,b2,γ1,γ2,γ3,β1,β2,T, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ q3, ¯ Q,q1,q2,Q).
This reduces to solving the system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.33), (C.36), (C.37), (C.40), (C.44) in the
unknowns (b1,b2,γ1,γ2,γ3,β1,β2,T, ¯ Q,Q): given (b1,b2,γ1,γ2,γ3,β1,β2,T, ¯ Q,Q), (b0, ¯ q1, ¯ q2, ¯ q3,q1,q2)
can be determined from the linear system of (C.38), (C.41)-(C.43), (C.45), (C.46), and a0 from
(C.34). We replace the system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.33), (C.36), (C.37), (C.40), (C.44) by the
equivalent system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.33), (C.40), (C.44),
ψb1
 













































1Σ1′ + (k1¯ q13 + k2¯ q23 − k1q12)
∆
1Σ1′. (C.48)
For s = 0, the unique non-negative solution of (5.7) is T = 0. Eqs. (5.5), (5.6), (C.8) and (C.13)-
(C.15) imply that β1 = β2 = ρ = k = k1 = k2 = 0. Eqs. (C.31)-(C.33), (C.40), (C.44), (C.47) and
(C.48) become
(r + κ)γ1 + b1γ3 = 0, (C.49)
(r + κ)γ2 = 0, (C.50)
(r + b2)γ3 = −r¯ αf, (C.51)






2 + κ 0 0
0 r









0 0 r¯ αλ






0) are as under symmetric information (Proposition 4.3). Given the unique positive
solution b2 of (B.52), (b1,γ3,γ1, ¯ Q,Q) are determined uniquely from (B.51), (C.51), (C.49), (B.49)

















under symmetric information. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 4.3, we can apply the im-
plicit function theorem and show that the system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.33), (C.40), (C.44),








2,T0, ¯ Q0,Q0), which corresponds to the unique equilibrium for s = 0. Since
b0
1 > 0, b0
2 > 0, γ0
1 > 0, γ0
3 < 0, continuity implies that b1 > 0, b2 > 0, γ1 > 0, γ3 < 0 for small
s. Since γ0
2 = 0, continuity does not establish the sign of γ2 for small s, so we need to study the








s2 + o(s2) ≡ ˆ β0
1s2 + o(s2), (C.53)
β2 = o(s2), (C.54)
respectively, where
o(s2)
s2 converges to zero when s goes to zero. Eqs. (C.8) and (C.13)-(C.15) imply
that
ρ = ˆ β0
1s2 + o(s2), (C.55)
k = 2ˆ β0
1γ0
1s2 + o(s2), (C.56)
k1 = ˆ β0
1s2 + o(s2), (C.57)
k2 = o(s2), (C.58)












































Eqs. (C.32), (C.55), (C.57), (C.58) and (C.59) imply that











Therefore, γ2 > 0 if λ ≥ 0.





























which is equal to (5.10) because of (C.13). Eqs. (3.20) (which is also valid under gradual adjust-
ment) and (5.10) imply that the proportionality coeﬃcient between the non-fundamental covariance
matrices under asymmetric and symmetric information is larger than one if k > s2γ2
1sym, where





































and rearranging (5.7), we ﬁnd
T2
 




























1Σ1′ = s2 − 2κT, (C.62)
71where the second step follows from (5.5) and (5.6). Substituting (C.61) and (C.62) into (C.60), we
ﬁnd
k = 2β1γ1 + s2(γ1 + γ2)2 − 2κTγ2
1




− κγ1 − (r + κ)γ2
 
, (C.63)
where the second step follows from (5.5).
Eqs. (C.52), (C.63) and γ0















2) are identical under symmetric and asymmetric information. Moreover, (B.47),
(B.48), (C.49) and (C.51) imply that the same is true for γ0
1. Therefore, k > s2γ2

























where the second step follows from (C.49) and (C.51), and the third from (B.51) and (B.52). Since
b0
2 > 0, (C.65) holds.






1 ˆ Ct + γR
2 Ct + γR














1 ˆ Ct + γR
2 Ct + γR































where the ﬁrst step follows from (C.7), the second from (C.34), and the third from (5.11). Eq.
(C.66) is equivalent to (3.21) because of (5.10).
Eqs. (C.31) and (C.32) imply that γR
1 and γR
2 have the opposite sign of k1¯ q11 + k2¯ q12 and
k1¯ q12 +k2¯ q22, respectively. Eqs. (C.57) and (C.58) imply that for small s, the latter variables have
72the same sign as ¯ q0
11 and ¯ q0
12, respectively. Since b0
1 > 0 and b0
2 > 0, (C.59) implies that ¯ q0
11 > 0
and ¯ q0
12 has the same sign as −λ. Therefore, for small s, γR
1 < 0 and γR
2 has the same sign as λ.
Moreover, γR
3 < 0 since b2 > 0 and γ3 < 0.






1 ˆ Ct′ + γR









1 ˆ Ct′ + γR




The covariances (C.67) and (C.68) depend only on how the Brownian shocks dBD
t and dBF
t , re-
spectively, impact ( ˆ Ct′,Ct′,yt′). To compute the impact of these shocks, as well as of dBC
t for the
next corollary, we solve the impulse-response dynamics
dCt = −κCtdt,
d ˆ Ct =
 





b1 ˆ Ct + b2yt
 
dt,
with the initial conditions
Ct = sdBC
t ,













The solution to these dynamics is (B.57),






























































= (r + κ + ρ)β1
 
b1γ3








b2 − κ − ρ
= −
(r + b2)b1β1γ3
b2 − κ − ρ
. (C.72)
The function χD(u) ≡ χD
1 e−(κ+ρ)u + χD
2 e−b2u can change sign only once, is equal to −β1γR
1 when
u = 0, and has the sign of χ1 if b2 > κ + ρ and of χ2 if b2 < κ + ρ when u goes to ∞. For small s,
χ(0) > 0 since γR
1 < 0. Since, in addition, b1 > 0, b2 > 0, γ1 > 0, γ3 < 0 and ρ > 0, (C.71) and
(C.72) imply that χ1 < 0 if b2 > κ+ρ and χ2 < 0 if b2 < κ+ρ. Therefore, there exists a threshold
ˆ uD > 0 such that χ(u) > 0 for 0 < u < ˆ uD and χ(u) < 0 for u > ˆ uD.











1 ˆ Ct′ + γR















1 ˆ Ct′ + γR














1 ˆ Ct′ + γR
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74The function χ(u) ≡ χ1e−(κ+ρ)u + χ2e−κu + χ3e−b2u has the same sign as ˆ χ(u) ≡ χ1e−ρu + χ2 +
















when u = 0, and has the sign of χ2 if b2 > κ and ρ > 0 and of χ3 if b2 < κ and ρ > 0 when u goes
to ∞. Moreover, its derivative ˆ χ′(u) = −χ1ρe−ρu − χ3(b2 − κ)e−(b2−κ)u is equal to
















when u = 0. For small s, χ(0) > 0 since γR
1 < 0 and s2γ2/β1 = o(1). Since, in addition, b1 > 0,
b2 > 0, γ1 > 0, γ2 > 0, γ3 < 0, γR
3 < 0 and ρ > 0, (C.75) and (C.76) imply that χ2 < 0 if b2 > κ
and χ3 < 0 if b2 < κ, and (C.77) implies that ˆ χ′(0) < 0. Since ˆ χ′(u) can change sign only once,
it is either negative or negative and then positive. Therefore, ˆ χ(u) is positive and then negative.
The same is true for χ(u), which means that there exists a threshold ˆ u > 0 such that χ(u) > 0 for
0 < u < ˆ u and χ(u) < 0 for u > ˆ u.
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